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DIY CRISPR* 
CHRISTI J. GUERRINI, G. EVAN SPENCER & PATRICIA J. ZETTLER** 
Although scientists have been manipulating genomes since the 
1970s, the recent discovery of Clustered Regularly Interspaced 
Short Palindromic Repeats (“CRISPR”) has expanded the 
possibilities not only for what gene editing might accomplish but 
also who might accomplish it. Because CRISPR is relatively 
easy, efficient, and inexpensive, it is accessible to individuals—
known as “citizen scientists”—who work in nontraditional 
laboratory settings and may not have formal scientific training. 
Prompted by concerns about human applications of CRISPR, 
the United States is cohosting a series of international summits on 
human gene editing, while organizations around the world race 
to issue their own reports and recommendations. For the most 
part, however, these efforts have focused on the use of CRISPR 
by professional scientists working in institutional settings who are 
already subject to layers of formal and informal oversight. They 
have largely overlooked the do-it-yourself (“DIY”) use of 
CRISPR by citizen scientists—even as instances of self-
experimentation with CRISPR are being reported and raising 
unique concerns. 
Drawing on qualitative interviews with almost forty citizen 
scientists and their supporters, critics, and observers, this Article 
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provides a critical analysis of the practice and governance of 
DIY CRISPR in the United States. It concludes that existing laws 
and regulations potentially reach a number of DIY CRISPR 
activities, although their application to citizen-science contexts is 
thus far untested. Meanwhile, DIY communities have developed 
mechanisms of self-regulation that appear to be working 
reasonably well thus far in discouraging potentially dangerous 
human applications of CRISPR by citizen scientists. However, 
we are concerned about the possibility that, as lay understanding 
of and proficiency with the technology increases, there will be an 
uptick in risky (if not illegal) human experimentation in the 
future. Therefore, this Article concludes with suggestions for 
shoring up the oversight readiness and capacities of regulatory 
bodies and DIY communities. 
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INTRODUCTION 
On October 3, 2017, a biohacker named Josiah Zayner made 
headlines when he injected himself with a needle that purportedly 
contained a gene-editing tool called CRISPR—short for Clustered 
Regularly Interspaced Short Palindromic Repeats—in front of a live 
audience.1 The self-injection occurred during a conference workshop 
that he was leading titled “A Step-By-Step Guide To Genetically 
Modifying Yourself with CRISPR.”2 Dr. Zayner, who earned a Ph.D. 
in molecular biophysics from the University of Chicago, spoke at the 
front of a packed room near a table that displayed his how-to 
pamphlets for genetically modifying humans and a syringe filled with 
CRISPR molecular units, which were designed to promote muscle 
growth by deactivating a specific gene.3 Halfway through his talk, 
which was streamed online, an audience member asked Dr. Zayner 
what was holding him back from following his own instructions.4 He 
responded by picking up the syringe and injecting his forearm. Dr. 
Zayner told the audience, “I’ll let you know how it works out.”5 
 
 1. See Josiah Zayner, DIY Human CRISPR Myostatin Knock-Out, YOUTUBE (Oct. 
6, 2017), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=o6A9bbDI6fo [https://perma.cc/NT56-K25Z] 
[hereinafter Zayner, DIY Human CRISPR] (showing the self-injection starting at 20:23). 
For a discussion of the science of CRISPR-Cas9, see infra Part I. 
 2. Workshop: A Step-by-Step Guide to Genetically Modifying Yourself with CRISPR, 
SYNBIOBETA, http://sf2017.synbiobeta.com/sessions/step-step-guide-genetically-modifying-
crispr/ [https://perma.cc/GA7Y-LFLZ]. 
 3. See Kristen V. Brown, Genetically Engineering Yourself Sounds Like a Horrible 
Idea—But This Guy Is Doing It Anyway, GIZMODO (Nov. 29, 2017, 10:00 AM), 
https://gizmodo.com/genetically-engineering-yourself-sounds-like-a-horrible-1820189351 
[https://perma.cc/RYN3-T7UK] [hereinafter Brown, Genetically Engineering Yourself] 
(describing the workshop during which Dr. Zayner injected himself). More specifically, 
the CRISPR molecular units were designed to deactivate the gene for the protein 
myostatin. Animals without a functioning copy of the gene have been observed to develop 
extra large muscles. See, e.g., Qingyan Lv et al., Efficient Generation of Myostatin Gene 
Mutated Rabbit by CRISPR/Cas9, SCI. REP., Apr. 26, 2016, at 1, 1. Dr. Zayner 
provided additional background on the experiment on his personal website. See Josiah 
Zayner, The First Attempt at Human CRISPR Gene Editing, SCI. ART BEAUTY (Oct. 13, 
2017), http://www.josiahzayner.com/2017/10/the-first-human-to-attempt-crispr-gene.html 
[https://perma.cc/4YKL-G6HA]. 
 4. See Zayner, DIY Human CRISPR, supra note 1. 
 5. See id. Dr. Zayner has since expressed regret for at least certain aspects of this 
demonstration—in particular, that he “didn’t make it seem like [he] took it seriously” 
because observers “didn’t see the months of research and 1.5 years of experimentation 
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Only a few years earlier, Dr. Zayner was working at NASA to 
engineer bacteria for Mars.6 By 2015, however, he had grown 
frustrated with NASA,7 and so he left to launch an online business 
called The ODIN, which sells inexpensive genetic-engineering kits 
and custom genetic material.8 Dr. Zayner has since emerged as a 
leading figure in the burgeoning DIY biology movement. His message 
of self-empowerment and “screw the system” has struck a chord with 
individuals lacking formal training but who believe in their abilities to 
learn and do science on their own. His aim of democratizing science 
also has garnered some respect within the scientific establishment.9 
Dr. Zayner sealed his position as “the mad pirate-king of biotech” by 
posting videos on YouTube of a number of experiments he conducted 
on himself that include infusing his skin with fluorescent jellyfish 
proteins to make it glow.10 
Although various techniques to manipulate genomes have been 
in use since the 1970s,11 the recent development of CRISPR systems 
to accomplish gene editing has suddenly expanded the possibilities 
not only for what gene editing might accomplish but also who might 
accomplish it.12 Unlike older editing technologies that require 
 
beforehand.” Josiah Zayner, True Story: I Injected Myself with a CRISPR Genetic 
Enhancement, ANTISENSE (Nov. 13, 2018), http://theantisense.com/2018/11/13/true-story-i-
injected-myself-with-a-crispr-genetic-enhancement [https://perma.cc/Q3ET-S64B] [hereinafter 
Zayner, True Story]; see also Sarah Zhang, A Biohacker Regrets Publicly Injecting Himself 
with CRISPR, ATLANTIC (Feb. 20, 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/science/archive/
2018/02/biohacking-stunts-crispr/553511/ [https://perma.cc/Y36E-BJRY] (reporting Dr. 
Zayner’s expressions of regret about injecting himself with CRISPR). 
 6. See About Us, ODIN, http://www.the-odin.com/about-us/ [https://perma.cc/W3Y6-
WP5T]. 
 7. Zayner, True Story, supra note 5. 
 8. ODIN, http://www.the-odin.com/ [https://perma.cc/37BN-P4ZG]. 
 9. See Brown, Genetically Engineering Yourself, supra note 3. 
 10. See id. A video of one of these experiments is posted on Dr. Zayner’s YouTube 
channel. Josiah Zayner, How to Genetically Engineer a Human in Your Garage, 
YOUTUBE (Feb. 15, 2017), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=imTXcEh79lw 
[https://perma.cc/6U2L-NFQP]. 
 11. See Paul Enríquez, Genome Editing and the Jurisprudence of Scientific 
Empiricism, 19 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 603, 621–33 (2017) (recounting this history and 
delineating the differences between the technologies).  
 12. The use of a CRISPR system consisting of Cas9 and an associated guide RNA to 
target a specific DNA sequence was described for the first time in 2012. See generally 
Martin Jinek et al., A Programmable Dual-RNA-Guided DNA Endonuclease in Adaptive 
Bacterial Immunity, 337 SCIENCE 816 (2012) (describing the molecular function of Cas9 in 
gene editing). By 2015, understanding and application of CRISPR had matured to the 
point that its “true power” was revealed. John Travis, Making the Cut: CRISPR Genome-
Editing Technology Shows Its Power, 350 SCIENCE 1456, 1456 (awarding CRISPR the 
journal’s 2015 Breakthrough of the Year Award). For a description of the twenty-year 
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sophisticated equipment and are notoriously complicated and error 
prone, CRISPR is relatively easy, efficient, and inexpensive to use.13 
It can be practiced in school, community, and home laboratories by 
individuals without doctoral-level training, major research budgets, or 
state-of-the-art equipment.14 Even teenagers are redesigning genomes 
with CRISPR, following protocols described in textbooks, published 
in journals, or in some cases, developed themselves.15 
Until recently, the conventional wisdom was that most DIY 
CRISPR activities did not involve complex organisms.16 Dr. Zayner’s 
live-streamed demonstration was therefore a wake-up call to the 
potential for CRISPR to be used in humans outside of traditional 
scientific institutions, starting with one’s own genome. Although some 
experts have emphasized that self-editing will require more 
sophisticated materials than those sold by Dr. Zayner,17 others close 
 
backstory to the discovery of CRISPR as a tool for genetic engineering in mammalian 
cells, see generally Eric S. Lander, The Heroes of CRISPR, 164 CELL 18 (2016). 
 13. See David Baltimore et al., A Prudent Path Forward for Genomic Engineering and 
Germline Gene Modification, 348 SCIENCE 36, 36 (2015) (explaining that previous 
technologies could not make “specific and efficient modifications to a genome,” severely 
limiting the ability to use them); Barry R. Furrow, The CRISPR-Cas9 Tool of Gene 
Editing: Cheaper, Faster, Riskier?, 26 ANNALS HEALTH L. 33, 33 (2017) (explaining that 
CRISPR is “easily accessible, the equipment is relatively cheap, and not much training is 
required”); Annie Sneed, Mail-Order CRISPR Kits Allow Absolutely Anyone to Hack 
DNA, SCI. AM. (Nov. 2, 2017), https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/mail-order-crispr-
kits-allow-absolutely-anyone-to-hack-dna/ [https://perma.cc/D7AD-75YX] (comparing 
CRISPR to older gene-editing technologies). See generally Jennifer A. Doudna & 
Emmanuelle Charpentier, The New Frontier of Genome Engineering with CRISPR-Cas9, 
346 SCIENCE 1077 (2014) (describing the difficulties of protein design, synthesis and 
validation associated with older technologies, including zinc-finger nucleases (“ZFNs”) 
and transcription activator-like effector nucleases (“TALENs”), which created barriers to 
their widespread adoption for routine use). 
 14. See discussion infra Part II. 
 15. See, e.g., ELEONORE PAUWELS & SARAH W. DENTON, WILSON CTR., THE RISE 
OF THE BIO-CITIZEN 40–41 (Todd Kuiken ed., 2018) (describing high school student 
Vardhaan Ambat’s experiments in a community laboratory using CRISPR to kill cancer 
cells); cf. Emily Baumgaertner, As D.I.Y. Gene Editing Gains Popularity, ‘Someone Is 
Going to Get Hurt’, N.Y. TIMES (May 14, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/14/
science/biohackers-gene-editing-virus.html [http://perma.cc/J8WU-Q9D6 (dark archive)] 
(describing teenager Keoni Gandall’s genetic experimentation in a home laboratory). 
 16. See, e.g., Margaret Foster Riley, CRISPR Creations and Human Rights, 11 LAW & 
ETHICS HUM. RTS. 225, 230 (2017) (observing that “sophisticated use of CRISPR in 
complex organisms is probably out of the reach of an average biohacker right now”). 
 17. See Stephanie M. Lee, This Guy Says He’s the First Person to Attempt Editing His 
DNA with CRISPR, BUZZFEED NEWS (Oct. 14, 2017, 12:07 PM), 
https://www.buzzfeed.com/stephaniemlee/this-biohacker-wants-to-edit-his-own-dna?utm_term=
.cioZL7N8G6#.xpjg1pvKeJ [https://perma.cc/VV46-8ZYQ] (quoting a CRISPR expert who 
remarked that “[t]o do real, effective genome-editing, it’s going to require a more 
sophisticated laboratory and more sophisticated materials” than those provided by Dr. 
Zayner). 
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to DIY communities are convinced that it is only a matter of time 
before citizen scientists attain the necessary skills and resources to 
perform successful human gene editing.18 In the meantime, and 
regardless of whether DIY biologists ever achieve their gene-editing 
objectives, the physical risks associated with making and introducing 
unregulated gene technologies into one’s body, which include 
infection, immunological reaction, and unintended cellular changes, 
are frequently noted concerns.19 Concerns have also been raised 
about potential copycats and the lack of oversight to ensure that self-
experimenters who follow Dr. Zayner’s example understand those 
risks.20 Indeed, Dr. Zayner has expressed his own worries about self-
 
 18. See The Ethics of Experimentation with Alex Pearlman, FUTURE GRIND (Sept. 30, 
2017), https://futuregrind.org/podcast-episodes/2018/5/17/ep-7-the-ethics-of-experimentation-
with-alex-pearlman [https://perma.cc/RFD7-2BXB]; see also Albert C. Lin, Herding Cats: 
Governing Distributed Innovation, 96 N.C. L. REV. 945, 951 (2018) (observing that the 
capabilities of DIY biologists are improving and their gene-editing activities “cannot be 
ignored in light of the technology’s increasing power and accessibility”); Will Tauxe, 
Q&A: Tim Lu, Cocktail Maker, 528 NATURE S14, S14 (2015) (quoting synthetic biology 
researcher Tim Lu, who opined that, because CRISPR-Cas systems are so easy to use, 
“[t]he democratization of biological engineering is inevitable”). 
 19. See generally Michael Kosicki, Kärt Tomberg & Allan Bradley, Repair of 
Double-Strand Breaks Induced by CRISPR–Cas9 Leads to Large Deletions and 
Complex Rearrangements, 36 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 765 (2018) (describing 
harmful on-target effects of CRISPR in mouse embryonic stem cells); Xiao-Hui Zhang et 
al., Off-Target Effects in CRISPR/Cas9-Mediated Genome Engineering, 4 MOLECULAR 
THERAPY—NUCLEIC ACIDS, no. e264, Nov. 17, 2015, at 1 (reviewing the basic 
mechanisms underlying off-target cutting in the CRISPR/Cas9 system); Marcy Darnovsky, 
Hacking Your Own Genes: A Recipe for Disaster, LEAPSMAG (Jan. 17, 2018), 
https://leapsmag.com/hacking-genes-recipe-disaster/ [https://perma.cc/M9NN-B2B7] (quoting 
a microbiologist who explained that “[s]crewing up” the purification of what is injected 
“can kill you from endotoxin”); Eleonore Pauwels, The Rise of Citizen Bioscience, SCI. 
AM. (Jan. 5, 2018), https://blogs.scientificamerican.com/observations/the-rise-of-citizen-
bioscience [https://perma.cc/RKT3-WJW5] (noting the potential for infection and 
immunological reaction from use of unregulated gene therapies). 
 20. See Darnovsky, supra note 19 (worrying that Dr. Zayner’s demonstration “is 
likely to encourage emulation” given his “bad-boy celebrity status”). Concerns about 
copycats have been substantiated by Dr. Zayner himself, who claims to have received 
“literally hundreds” of emails in the days after his CRISPR self-injection from individuals 
wanting to do the same. See Brown, Genetically Engineering Yourself, supra note 3. 
Conversely, one scholar has speculated that public demonstrations like Dr. Zayner’s could 
invite too much oversight and result in severely restricting or even shutting down the 
broader efforts of citizen scientists seeking to make positive contributions to biomedical 
research. Pauwels, supra note 19; see also Steph Yin, Is DIY Kitchen CRISPR a Class 
Issue?, POPULAR SCI. (May 3, 2016), https://www.popsci.com/is-bringing-crispr-to-
kitchens-class-issue [http://perma.cc/457T-DAQY] (describing the concerns of a 
community laboratory founder that Dr. Zayner’s generally “cavalier” attitude toward 
safety practices could “bring about increased regulation which would limit access” to 
biotechnology). 
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experimentation with CRISPR, even while he works to facilitate a 
future of recreational genetic engineering.21 
Questions about the safety and ethics of human gene editing are 
not new.22 In recent years, however, they became a priority when 
research groups around the world began announcing their use of 
CRISPR to edit the reproductive cells of nonimplanted human 
embryos.23 Responding to an international call to action by prominent 
genomic scientists,24 the U.S. National Academies of Sciences, 
Engineering, and Medicine (“National Academies”) joined 
policymakers in the United Kingdom and China to convene a series 
of international summits to investigate the social and ethical 
implications of CRISPR,25 while organizations around the world 
raced to issue their own reports and recommendations.26 In the past 
 
 21. See Brown, Genetically Engineering Yourself, supra note 3; Zayner, True Story, 
supra note 5 (“I also regret that other people then decided to try and inject themselves 
with ‘gene therapies’ that didn’t have much scientific basis. I regret that I made people 
think that doing a gene therapy injection was a stunt that could get them famous, and that 
I didn’t emphasize enough that, to me, this was a serious endeavor.”). 
 22. See, e.g., Joseph Fletcher, Ethical Aspects of Genetic Control: Designed Genetic 
Changes in Man, 285 NEW ENG. J. MED. 776, 776–79 (1971) (exploring ethical 
justifications for human genetic interventions); Michael J. Reiss, What Sort of People Do 
We Want? The Ethics of Changing People Through Genetic Engineering, 13 NOTRE DAME 
J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 63, 76–90 (1999) (examining the ethical significance of 
engineering human somatic and germline cells); John A. Robertson, Procreative Liberty in 
the Era of Genomics, 29 AM. J.L. & MED. 439, 473–80 (2003) (discussing ethical issues 
associated with gene editing of human embryos to achieve various objectives). 
 23. See, e.g., Xiangjin Kang et al., Introducing Precise Genetic Modifications into 
Human 3PN Embryos by CRISPR/Cas-Mediated Genome Editing, 33 J. ASSISTED 
REPROD. & GENETICS 581, 583–84 (2016) (reporting the introduction of an HIV-
resistance allele into nonviable human embryos); Puping Liang et al., CRISPR/Cas9-
Mediated Gene Editing in Human Tripronuclear Zygotes, 6 PROTEIN & CELL 363, 366 
(2015) (reporting experiments that used CRISPR to cleave the human gene HBB in 
nonviable human embryos). Researchers have also used CRISPR to modify genomes of 
viable human embryos that were not implanted for birth. See, e.g., Yanting Zeng et al., 
Correction of the Marfan Syndrome Pathogenic FBN1 Mutation by Base Editing in Human 
Cells and Heterozygous Embryos, 26 MOLECULAR THERAPY 2631, 2635–36 (2018). 
 24. See Baltimore et al., supra note 13, at 37–38 (concluding that “the potential safety 
and efficacy issues arising from the use of CRISPR technology must be thoroughly 
investigated and understood before any attempts at human engineering are sanctioned, if 
ever, for clinical testing” and recommending that a “globally representative group” of 
scientists, policymakers, members of the public, and experts in genetics, law, and bioethics 
be convened to consider these issues); Edward Lanphier et al., Don’t Edit the Human 
Germ Line, 519 NATURE 410, 411 (2015) (urging the international scientific community 
“to assess whether, and under what circumstances—if any—future research involving 
genetic modification of human germ cells should take place”). 
 25. Human Genome Editing Initiative, NAT’L ACADS. SCI. ENG’G & MED., 
http://nationalacademies.org/gene-editing/index.htm [https://perma.cc/X9JH-CRXV]. 
 26. See, e.g., NAT’L ACADS. OF SCIS., ENG’G, & MED., HUMAN GENOME EDITING: 
SCIENCE, ETHICS, AND GOVERNANCE 1–2 (2017) [hereinafter NASEM, HUMAN 
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few months, this work became still more urgent after a Chinese 
scientist reported editing the genomes of implanted twin human 
embryos that resulted in the births of the first so-called CRISPR 
babies.27 Although it remains unclear whether he succeeded in 
making the intended edits, the news has sparked heated debate about 
the adequacy of the existing oversight of CRISPR applications in 
humans.28 
Notably, these efforts have focused on the use of CRISPR by 
credentialed scientists working in institutional settings who are 
already subject to layers of oversight.29 Yet the use of CRISPR by 
citizen scientists working in nontraditional settings introduces new 
dimensions to ethical and regulatory questions about human gene 
editing that also merit attention.30 
This Article makes two primary contributions to the analysis of 
these questions. First, drawing on qualitative interviews with almost 
forty citizen scientists and their supporters, critics, and observers, it 
describes current and possible future applications of CRISPR by 
citizen scientists.31 Second, it provides a detailed account of the 
 
GENOME EDITING]; NUFFIELD COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS, GENOME EDITING AND 
HUMAN REPRODUCTION: SOCIAL AND ETHICAL ISSUES, at vii (2018) [hereinafter 
NUFFIELD COUNCIL 2018]. 
 27. See, e.g., David Cyranoski & Heidi Ledford, Genome-Edited Baby Claim 
Provokes International Outcry, 563 NATURE 607, 607 (2018). 
 28. See, e.g., R. Alta Charo, Rogues and Regulation of Germline Editing, 380 NEW 
ENG. J. MED. 976, 977–79 (2019). Since the announcement, the World Health 
Organization stated that it is establishing an expert panel to assess the “scientific, ethical, 
social and legal challenges associated with human gene editing (both somatic and germ 
cell).” Gene Editing, WORLD HEALTH ORG. (Dec. 14, 2018), https://www.who.int/
ethics/topics/gene-editing/en/ [https://perma.cc/2FJV-3Q6A]. Scientific and medical groups 
around the world also are in discussions to develop guidelines on the alteration of human 
germlines. See Sharon Begley, After ‘CRISPR Babies,’ International Medical Leaders Aim 
to Tighten Genome Editing Guidelines, STAT (Jan. 24, 2019), https://www.statnews.com/
2019/01/24/crispr-babies-show-need-for-more-specific-rules/ [https://perma.cc/YWH4-SWL2].  
 29. For example, the National Academies consensus study report includes one 
mention of gene editing by biohackers. NASEM, HUMAN GENOME EDITING, supra note 
26, at 25. Similarly, gene editing by “DIY biology enthusiasts” is mentioned once in the 
Nuffield Council’s 2018 report, NUFFIELD COUNCIL 2018, supra note 26, at 132, although 
it receives more attention in the organization’s 2016 report, NUFFIELD COUNCIL ON 
BIOETHICS, GENOME EDITING: AN ETHICAL REVIEW 13, 39–40, 92, 99–100, 103 n.483, 
107 (2016) [hereinafter NUFFIELD COUNCIL 2016].  
 30. Cf. Henry T. Greely, Take Care!, STAT (Mar. 14, 2016), 
https://www.statnews.com/2016/03/14/crispr-do-it-yourself/#Greely [https://perma.cc/V8FQ-
8YNA] (“Universities, research institutes, and big corporations are relatively easy to find 
and regulate. Finding and regulating do-it-yourself users is much harder and, under our 
current system, impossible. We urgently need to find a balanced regulatory approach that 
allows responsible do-it-yourself use while protecting health and the environment.”).  
 31. As noted in the authors’ acknowledgment, some interviewees participated on a 
nonconfidential basis. 
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oversight of DIY human gene editing by existing external and 
internal mechanisms. Here, external oversight refers to legal and 
regulatory mechanisms developed and implemented by government 
authorities, whereas internal oversight refers to policies, practices, and 
norms adopted by DIY biologists. This Article concludes that existing 
laws and regulations potentially reach a number of DIY human gene-
editing activities, although their application to citizen-science contexts 
is thus far untested. Meanwhile, DIY communities have developed 
mechanisms of self-regulation that appear to be working reasonably 
well thus far in discouraging potentially dangerous human 
applications of CRISPR by citizen scientists. However, this Article 
presents concerns about the possibility that, as lay understanding of 
and proficiency with the technology increases, there will be an uptick 
in risky (if not illegal) human experimentation in the future. 
Therefore, this Article offers suggestions for shoring up the oversight 
readiness and capacities of regulatory bodies and DIY communities.
  
The analysis is subject to several limitations. First, it is focused 
on DIY applications of CRISPR. It does not address other possible 
citizen-science activities, such as the manufacture of synthetic DNA 
or marketed pharmaceuticals, although similar considerations may 
apply.32 Second, the analysis is limited to human applications of 
CRISPR. Although CRISPR can be used to modify the genome of 
any living cell and important concerns have been raised about 
nonhuman applications,33 addressing the complete range of these 
activities, their consequences, and possible mechanisms for 
controlling them is outside the scope of this Article. Rather, this 
Article is focused on one technological application—CRISPR-
enabled editing of human genomes—that has received significant 
attention. Third, although DIY CRISPR is occurring around the 
world, this Article focuses on activities that are subject to U.S. laws, 
regulations, institutional rules, and social and scientific norms. The 
analysis and recommendations therefore may have limited 
 
 32. Cf. Jenna E. Gallegos et al., The Open Insulin Project: A Case Study for 
‘Biohacked’ Medicines, 36 TRENDS BIOTECHNOLOGY 1211, 1212 (2018) (describing the 
Open Insulin Project, which seeks to develop and release a protocol for manufacturing off-
patent insulin). 
 33. Nonhuman CRISPR applications include altering species in ways that harm the 
environment and creating viruses, bacteria, and toxins for use as biological weapons. See, 
e.g., R. Alta Charo & Henry T. Greely, CRISPR Critters and CRISPR Cracks, 15 AM. J. 
BIOETHICS, Dec. 2015, at 11, 11; Diane DiEuliis & James Giordano, Gene Editing Using 
CRISPR/Cas9: Implications for Dual-Use and Biosecurity, 9 PROTEIN & CELL 239, 240 
(2018). 
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applicability to other countries, with the exception that points related 
to self-governance may be broadly applicable.34 
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I provides a brief technical 
description of CRISPR and its human applications to facilitate 
understanding of the relevant citizen-science activities that are 
currently underway or that may be possible in the future. Part II then 
describes the citizen-science contexts in which CRISPR is or might 
eventually be practiced, as well as some unique risks and benefits 
associated with these activities. Next, Part III analyzes the external 
and internal mechanisms that govern or potentially could govern DIY 
human gene editing in the United States, including laws and 
regulations, codes of ethics, and biosafety policies and practices. Part 
IV evaluates the effectiveness of this oversight regime and makes 
recommendations that we hope, on balance, will improve the ability 
of regulatory bodies and DIY communities to detect and discourage 
risky activities with minimal interference to citizen science’s 
educational, creative, and innovative potential. 
Because the meanings of many terms used in this Article are 
evolving, they are identified here to avoid confusion. Citizen science 
broadly describes any scientific endeavor in which members of the 
public participate as volunteers in one or more activities relevant to 
the research process other than (or in addition to) allowing personal 
data or specimens to be collected from them.35 Such activities might 
encompass the entirety of the research process.36 Participants in 
citizen science are citizen scientists.37 Citizen science occurring in the 
life sciences is referred to, interchangeably, as citizen bioscience, DIY 
biology, and biohacking,38 and citizen scientists engaged in these 
 
 34. With respect to countries that have similar laws, regulations, or institutional rules, 
this Article’s analysis and recommendations may still be informative despite not 
addressing the specific requirements in those other jurisdictions. 
 35. See, e.g., M.V. Eitzel et al., Citizen Science Terminology Matters: Exploring Key 
Terms, 2 CITIZEN SCI: THEORY & PRAC. 1, 5, 15 (2017) (defining citizen science as “the 
inclusion of members of the public in some aspect of scientific research”); Jennifer L. 
Shirk et al., Public Participation in Scientific Research: A Framework for Deliberate 
Design, 17 ECOLOGY & SOC’Y 29, 30 (2012) (defining “public participation in scientific 
research” as “intentional collaborations in which members of the public engage in the 
process of research to generate new science-based knowledge”).  
 36. Cf. Shirk et al., supra note 35, at 32–33 (categorizing kinds of citizen-science 
research). 
 37. It should be recognized, however, that there is no consensus regarding what 
term(s) may or should be used to refer to individuals who engage in citizen science. See 
Eitzel et al., supra note 35, at 2, 11–15. 
 38. This Article also recognizes the debate regarding the relationship between citizen 
bioscience, DIY biology, and biohacking. One scholar defines DIY biology as “the term 
life science enthusiasts claim for biology work in laboratories set up outside of 
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activities are citizen bioscientists, DIY biologists, and biohackers.39 
The CRISPR-enabled editing of genomes by these individuals is DIY 
CRISPR. 
I.  CRISPR SCIENCE AND APPLICATIONS 
Because a basic understanding of CRISPR is necessary to 
evaluate its oversight, this part provides an overview of the science 
and human applications of CRISPR. Briefly, CRISPR describes a 
system that directs a protein to disable or alter specific DNA 
sequences.  
A. CRISPR Science 
CRISPR refers to an adaptive immune system found in bacteria 
and archaea that has been repurposed by humans to conduct gene 
editing.40 The process of gene editing using CRISPR encompasses 
sending a CRISPR associated (“Cas”) protein and a guide RNA 
(“gRNA”) to a predetermined location in the DNA of a target cell 
for the purpose of disabling or altering a specific gene.41 
The power of CRISPR lies in the Cas protein, which acts as a 
pair of molecular scissors that cut DNA.42 Although many Cas 
proteins are known to be effective in gene editing, Cas9 is a popular 
 
professional science spaces” and having (according to some accounts) the “goals of citizen 
science,” whereas biohacking has a wider range of activities and goals that include 
bodyhacking. See Lisa C. Ikemoto, DIY Bio: Hacking Life in Biotech’s Backyard, 51 U.C. 
DAVIS L. REV. 539, 542–43, 548–49 (2017). Others have described DIY biologists as “part 
of [a] social movement that engages individuals and community groups in the study of the 
life sciences outside of traditional institutions, often aligning with open science and maker 
community ideals,” whereas biohackers “tend to have a more explicitly political bent to 
their work.” Amelia Fiske et al., Conceptual and Ethical Considerations for Citizen Science 
in Biomedicine, in PERSONAL HEALTH SCIENCE 195, 204 (Nils B. Heyen et al. eds., 2019). 
During interviews with biohackers, we heard these terms distinguished in still other ways. 
Gabriel Licina suggested doing away with these terms altogether and referring to all 
biological research activities, regardless of who is conducting them or where they are being 
conducted, as simply “biology.” Telephone Interview with Gabriel Licina, Indep. 
Biohacker and Chief Research Officer, SciHouse (Aug. 9, 2018) (on file with author); see 
also Telephone Interview with Justin Atkin, Founder, The Thought Emporium (Oct. 15, 
2018) (on file with author) (“[My DIY biology activities are] really just biology. We’re not 
hacking anything. We’re doing exactly the same thing that every academic lab is.”). 
 39. See Daniel Grushkin, Biohackers Are About Open-Access to Science, Not DIY 
Pandemics. Stop Misrepresenting Us, STAT (June 4, 2018), https://www.statnews.com/
2018/06/04/biohacker-open-access-science/ [https://perma.cc/7236-69ZN] (observing that 
these terms are interchangeable). 
 40. Enríquez, supra note 11, at 629.  
 41. NASEM, HUMAN GENOME EDITING, supra note 26, at 65. 
 42. See Doudna & Charpentier, supra note 13, at 1258096-2. 
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choice, especially for editing human genomes.43 Fully enabled Cas9 
cuts both strands of DNA, but the protein can also be modified to cut 
only a single strand.44 
In order to be effective, the Cas protein must know exactly which 
DNA sequence in the genome to cut.45 This is the job of gRNA, which 
binds to the Cas protein to form a protein-RNA complex.46 Just as 
scientists are able to modify Cas proteins to perform different 
functions, scientists are able to design gRNA to match any known 
sequence in the genome.47 
After Cas9 has cut the DNA that matches the target sequence, 
the cell deploys its repair machinery, which then works to repair the 
broken DNA, resulting in a modified gene.48 In this way, Cas9 can 
turn off a gene, but it also can be accompanied by instructions from 
template DNA that have the effect of introducing a new gene at the 
location of the splice.49 
To access an organism’s DNA, the protein-RNA complex is 
usually embedded in a delivery system that will survive the protective 
mechanisms that organisms activate when they detect foreign 
bodies.50 Often the delivery system is a viral vector, but nonviral 
methods also have proven effective in some circumstances.51 
B. Target Cells 
In humans and other organisms that reproduce sexually, target 
cells of CRISPR are classified as either somatic cells or germ cells. 
Somatic cells encompass all cells of an organism other than its 
reproductive cells.52 Changes to somatic cell DNA alter the 
functionality of the targeted genes but do not affect genes passed on 
to offspring.53 
By contrast, DNA edits to germ cells, which are the reproductive 
cells of sexually reproducing organisms, are heritable.54 Germline 
 
 43. Id. at 1258096-4. 
 44. See id. (explaining that multiple Cas9s that are modified to cut only a single strand 
can be deployed at the same time to cut DNA in different locations). 
 45. Jinek et al., supra note 12, at 816. 
 46. Doudna & Charpentier, supra note 13, at 1258096-3. 
 47. NASEM, HUMAN GENOME EDITING, supra note 26, at 65. 
 48. Id. at 63–64, 66. 
 49. Id.  
 50. See id. at 96, 246–51. 
 51. See id. at 247–51 (describing advantages and disadvantages of various strategies 
for delivering gene-editing components to cells). 
 52. Id. at 5. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. at 6. 
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modification can therefore ensure that genes associated with 
inherited diseases are not passed on to offspring or, conversely, that 
genes associated with desirable conditions or traits (such as 
prophylactic protection against disease) are passed on to offspring.55 
For example, CRISPR can potentially rid families of the DNA 
mutation that causes Huntington’s disease, which usually does not 
manifest prior to adulthood.56  
Although Huntington’s and other inherited diseases are 
potentially treatable through somatic therapies,57 germline edits treat 
both current and future generations. For this reason, edits to germ 
cells raise different ethical issues than edits to somatic cells.58 For 
example, concerns have been raised about the use of the technology 
to create “superior” individuals who have been genetically enhanced 
for intelligence, beauty, or strength.59 There are also concerns about 
perpetuating changes that harm future generations in ways that 
cannot yet be appreciated, especially if there is no validated 
mechanism for reversing those changes.60 
C. Human Applications 
Potential human applications of CRISPR can generally be 
categorized by primary objective as basic discovery, therapeutic use, 
performance enhancement, or aesthetic use. While these categories 
are presented as distinct, they are fluid in practice where, as described 
below, the objective of a particular application depends on the 
baseline health of the targeted individual or the application has 
multiple objectives.61 Moreover, CRISPR can be applied, at least in 
 
 55. Id. at 111–12; see also Enríquez, supra note 11, at 668 (“[C]orrecting gene errors 
or conferring prophylactic protection to diseases in the germline means the changes can be 
inherited in a firm and self-perpetuating configuration to subsequent generations.”).  
 56. See Peggy C. Nopoulos, Huntington Disease: A Single-Gene Degenerative Disorder 
of the Striatum, 18 DIALOGUES CLINICAL NEUROSCIENCE 91, 92 (2016). 
 57. See Dianne Nicol et al., Key Challenges in Bringing CRISPR-Mediated Somatic 
Cell Therapy into the Clinic, GENOME MED., Sept. 25, 2017, at 1, 1. 
 58. For a discussion of safety, effectiveness, and ethical concerns that are relevant to 
the “CRISPR babies,” see HENRY T. GREELY, THE END OF SEX AND THE FUTURE OF 
HUMAN REPRODUCTION 179–84 (2016).  
 59. Sarah Ashley Barnett, Comment, Regulating Human Germline Modification in 
Light of CRISPR, 51 U. RICH. L. REV. 553, 570–71, 573 (2017) (describing how human 
germline modification could result in the practice of “positive” eugenics that reinforces 
stigmas and exacerbates inequalities).  
 60. Id. at 567–69.  
 61. See, e.g., 2 PRESIDENTIAL COMM’N FOR THE STUDY OF BIOETHICAL ISSUES, 
GRAY MATTERS: TOPICS AT THE INTERSECTION OF NEUROSCIENCE, ETHICS, AND 
SOCIETY 28 (2015), https://bioethicsarchive.georgetown.edu/pcsbi/sites/default/files/
GrayMatter_V2_508.pdf [http://perma.cc/K2FZ-G3NE] [hereinafter PRESIDENTIAL 
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theory, to both somatic and germ cells to accomplish any of these 
objectives. 
The first category, basic discovery, describes manipulating DNA 
in laboratory settings to learn about gene functions and 
relationships.62 By turning genes on and off in various combinations, 
CRISPR enables researchers to understand their roles and 
interactions.63 In addition, CRISPR can be utilized to elucidate DNA-
repair mechanisms, human development processes, links between 
genes and disease, and the progression of cancer and other diseases 
that are influenced by genetics.64 CRISPR is widely used in research 
laboratories for these investigative purposes. 
By contrast, clinical applications of CRISPR to treat disease 
remain in the early stages of development. Therapeutic uses, which is 
the second major category of human CRISPR applications, aim to 
disable or correct genetic mutations responsible for disease. For 
example, sickle cell disease, which produces misshapen red blood 
cells, is caused by a single DNA base mutation and is theoretically 
curable by replacing the mutated base with the correct base.65 
Conditions like sickle cell disease that are known to be caused by 
single gene mutations are currently the most promising candidates for 
therapeutic applications and are the subject of the first CRISPR 
clinical trials.66 However, disease treatment for humans might also be 
 
COMM’N] (noting that enhancement and treatment “are not always sharply 
distinguishable”); H.T. Greely, Direct Brain Interventions to “Treat” Disfavored Human 
Behaviors: Ethical and Social Issues, 91 CLINICAL PHARMACOLOGY & THERAPEUTICS 
163, 163 (2012) (“Behaviors do not come naturally labeled as ‘disease’ and ‘nondisease’; 
humans make those distinctions, and .	.	. we regularly change them .	.	.	.”). For a critique of 
the line drawn between drugs used for “legitimate medical purpose[s]” and those that are 
misused in the Controlled Substances Act, see generally Matt Lamkin, Legitimate 
Medicine in the Age of Consumerism (Aug. 8, 2018), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=3228692 [https://perma.cc/C27N-Q375 (staff-uploaded archive)]. 
 62. See NASEM, HUMAN GENOME EDITING, supra note 26, at 61–82. 
 63. See Patrick D. Hsu, Eric S. Lander & Feng Zhang, Development and Applications 
of CRISPR-Cas9 for Genome Engineering, 157 CELL 1262, 1262 (2014). 
 64. See NASEM, HUMAN GENOME EDITING, supra note 26, at 69. 
 65. See, e.g., Mark A. DeWitt et al., Selection-Free Genome Editing of the Sickle 
Mutation in Human Adult Hematopoietic Stem/Progenitor Cells, SCI. TRANSLATIONAL 
MED., Oct. 12, 2016, at 1, 1–2 (reporting a CRISPR technique to repair the mutation 
responsible for sickle cell disease); see also Heidi Ledford, CRISPR Deployed to Combat 
Sickle Cell Anaemia, NATURE (Oct. 12, 2016), https://www.nature.com/news/crispr-deployed-
to-combat-sickle-cell-anaemia-1.20782 [https://perma.cc/3J5Y-2V5M] (contextualizing the 
findings). 
 66. See A CRISPR Go, GENOMEWEB (Sept. 4, 2018), https://www.genomeweb.com/
scan/crispr-go#.W5_swpNKg0o [https://perma.cc/9NKS-XWC7 (staff-uploaded archive)]. 
As of the time of writing this Article, the FDA has authorized two clinical trials. Rich 
Haridy, FDA Hits Pause on One of the First US Human Clinical Trials to Use CRISPR, 
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accomplished by manipulating the DNA of a foreign disease agent. 
For example, CRISPR has been used experimentally to suppress 
human immunodeficiency virus 1 (“HIV-1”) replication in 
persistently and latently infected T cells.67 
Performance enhancement encompasses gene modifications that 
do not address specific health deficits but rather are intended to 
improve healthy individuals’ cognitive or physical performance to 
levels beyond the individuals’ normal functioning or the statistically 
normal range for humans.68 In the future, CRISPR could be used, for 
example, to modify human genes to stimulate the production of 
erythropoietin, which increases the supply of red blood cells.69 While 
stimulating erythropoietin production is a treatment for anemia, in 
healthy individuals it can enhance aerobic performance.70 
 
NEW ATLAS (May 31, 2018), https://newatlas.com/us-crispr-human-trial-hold-fda/54862/ 
[https://perma.cc/VSQ5-89M7]. In May 2018, the FDA placed one of the two trials on 
“clinical hold,” which meant the trial could not proceed, although the Agency ultimately 
lifted the hold in October 2018. Id.; Amirah Al Idrus, FDA Lifts Clinical Hold of 
Vertex/CRISPR Therapeutics’ Sickle Cell Drug, FIERCEBIOTECH (Oct. 10, 2018, 5:29 PM), 
https://www.fiercebiotech.com/biotech/fda-lifts-clinical-hold-vertex-crispr-therapeutics-
sickle-cell-med [https://perma.cc/8YEF-H5XX]. The FDA has not publicly explained 
why it put this particular trial on clinical hold, Haridy, supra, but the FDA may generally 
do so for a variety of reasons, including that the subjects would be “exposed to .	.	. 
unreasonable and significant risk(s)” or sufficient information to assess the risks to 
subjects was not provided by the sponsor of the trial, 21 C.F.R. §	312.42 (2018). 
 67. Youdiil Ophinni et al., CRISPR/Cas9 System Targeting Regulatory Genes of 
HIV-1 Inhibits Viral Replication in Infected T-Cell Cultures, SCI. REP., May 17, 2018, at 
1, 2. 
 68. PRESIDENTIAL COMM’N, supra note 61, at 28; see also Henry T. Greely, Remarks 
on Human Biological Enhancement, 56 U. KAN. L. REV. 1139, 1140 (2008) 
(“[Enhancement] is using things not only to repair or bring up the human norm, but also 
to surpass either the preexisting position or to go to the extreme—to move outside the 
normal human range.”); Maxwell J. Mehlman, The Law of Above Averages: Leveling the 
New Genetic Enhancement Playing Field, 85 IOWA L. REV. 517, 523 (2000) (“A genetic 
intervention is an ‘enhancement,’ however, (1) when it is undertaken for the purpose of 
improving a characteristic or capability that, but for the enhancement, would lie within 
what is generally accepted as a ‘normal’ range for humans; or (2) when it installs a 
characteristic or capability that is not normally present in humans.”). The use of CRISPR 
for enhancement rather than therapy, whether in biohacking or traditional contexts, raises 
its own social, ethical, and regulatory issues. See generally Maxwell J. Mehlman, How Will 
We Regulate Genetic Enhancement?, 34 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 671 (1999).  
 69. See Dev Mishra, CRISPR and the Super Athlete, SIDELINE SPORTS DOC (May 15, 
2018), http://www.sidelinesportsdoc.com/crispr-and-the-super-athlete/ [https://perma.cc/
L8Q6-B9LP] (discussing the possibility of manipulating the gene responsible for 
erythropoietin regulation to increase athletic performance). 
 70. See generally Olivier Salamin et al., Erythropoietin as a Performance-Enhancing 
Drug: Its Mechanistic Basis, Detection, and Potential Adverse Effects, 464 MOLECULAR & 
CELLULAR ENDOCRINOLOGY 75 (2018) (discussing the introduction of erythropoiesis-
stimulating agents, development of detection methods, and potential effects of their 
misuse). But see Jules A.A.C. Heuberger et al., Effects of Erythropoietin on Cycling 
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The last category, aesthetic uses, describes gene edits that have 
the effect of changing a person’s physical appearance. For example, 
eye or skin color might be altered by editing the genes that contribute 
to these characteristics. As another example, CRISPR could be used 
to make an individual’s metabolism more efficient by altering genes 
that control the manner in which the body stores and uses fat.71 If that 
individual has weight-related health problems and the edit causes 
weight loss that resolves these problems, the modification would be 
both aesthetic and therapeutic. 
Although the possibility of using CRISPR for human 
therapeutic, performance enhancing, and aesthetic purposes has 
attracted widespread attention, the reality is that many of these 
applications will not be technically feasible for some time. Thus far, 
the genetic bases of only a small number of conditions and traits have 
been identified, and most appear to be the result of multiple genes 
interacting in complex ways with each other and their environment.72 
Until those interactions are fully understood, CRISPR-induced gene 
changes are unlikely to achieve their intended objectives—even if 
adverse effects could be controlled.73 For this reason, commercial 
interest in CRISPR is currently focused on treating conditions caused 
by single gene mutations.74 Nevertheless, the complexities of genetics 
 
Performance of Well Trained Cyclists: A Double-Blind, Randomised, Placebo-Controlled 
Trial, 4 LANCET HAEMATOLOGY e374, e374 (2017) (concluding that a recombinant 
human erythropoietin treatment did not affect clinically relevant exercise test 
performance and road race performance in trained cyclists). Although accomplished by 
injection of a biologic drug form of erythropoietin, rather than gene-editing techniques, 
such “blood doping” has been reported as common among elite cyclists, including, most 
famously, Lance Armstrong. See, e.g., Dave Siebert, Lance Armstrong Confesses to PEDs: 
What is Erythropoietin (EPO) Blood Doping?, BLEACHER REP. (Jan. 16, 2013), 
https://bleacherreport.com/articles/1471562-lance-armstrong-confesses-to-peds-what-
is-erythropoietin-epo-blood-doping [https://perma.cc/GP6U-SXEE]. 
 71. Indeed, scientists are using CRISPR to study a genetic variant associated with 
obesity. Melina Claussnitzer et al., FTO Obesity Variant Circuitry and Adipocyte Browning 
in Humans, 373 NEW ENG. J. MED. 895, 896–98 (2015). 
 72. See, e.g., Matthew R. Robinson, Naomi R. Wray & Peter M. Visscher, Explaining 
Additional Genetic Variation in Complex Traits, 30 TRENDS GENETICS 124, 124 (2014) 
(observing that most “biological phenotypes and many of the characters of interest to 
humans are complex in that they are determined by many mutations at multiple loci, as 
well as by many nongenetic factors”). 
 73. See Enríquez, supra note 11, at 672–85 (dismissing concerns that CRISPR might 
be used to create “‘designer babies’ with a panoply of artificial traits,” such as enhanced 
intelligence and tall stature, given that “human knowledge is vastly incomplete concerning 
the genetics of these complex polygenic traits”).  
 74. See Lu Xiao-Jie et al., CRISPR-Cas9: A New and Promising Player in Gene 
Therapy, 52 J. MED. GENETICS 289, 291 (2015) (explaining that, “[c]ompared with 
polygenic diseases such as cancer, monogenic disorders are more amenable to gene 
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have not dampened public excitement about the prospect of human 
gene editing, nor has it discouraged citizen bioscientists from 
attempting to conduct their own CRISPR experiments for a number 
of purposes. 
II.  THE USE OF CRISPR BY DIY BIOLOGISTS 
This part describes the use of CRISPR in citizen-bioscience 
settings. It begins with a brief history of DIY biology and its diverse 
communities of practitioners and supporters. It then details the 
private and communal settings in which DIY biology is occurring in 
the United States with an emphasis on DIY CRISPR. It concludes by 
considering some unique risks and benefits associated with these 
activities. 
A. The Rise of DIY Biology 
Although the term citizen science has only recently entered 
common usage,75 there is a long tradition of self-trained “amateurs” 
conducting research in various scientific fields, including astronomy, 
ornithology, and agriculture.76 In the life sciences, famous hobbyists 
include the monk Gregor Mendel, whose pea-breeding experiments 
in the mid-1800s uncovered the mechanisms of heredity.77 There is 
also a long tradition in medicine of self-experimentation.78 
In the late 1800s, however, science became less accessible to the 
general public as it became professionalized.79 This transformation 
was the result of several factors that include a rise in 
“experimentalism” that moved science from the field to the 
laboratory.80 In the decades since, the biomedical sciences in 
particular have largely been restricted to those with advanced 
 
therapies,” and so currently their correction “represents the most translatable field in 
CRISPR-Cas9-mediated gene therapy”).  
 75. Jonathan Silvertown, A New Dawn for Citizen Science, 24 TRENDS ECOLOGY & 
EVOLUTION 467, 470 (2009).  
 76. See id. at 467; see also Günter Seyfried, Lei Pei & Markus Schmidt, European Do-
It-Yourself (DIY) Biology: Beyond the Hope, Hype and Horror, 36 BIOESSAYS 548, 548 
(2014); Nora S. Vaage, Fringe Biotechnology, 12 BIOSOCIETIES 109, 115–16 (2017).  
 77. See Vaage, supra note 76, at 116. 
 78. See generally Allen B. Weisse, Self-Experimentation and Its Role in Medical 
Research, 39 TEX. HEART INST. J. 51 (2012) (discussing instances of self-experimentation 
by medical researchers over the past 200 years). 
 79. Fiske et al., supra note 38, at 198. 
 80. Dana Mahr et al., Watching or Being Watched: Enhancing Productive Discussion 
Between the Citizen Sciences, the Social Sciences and the Humanities, in CITIZEN SCIENCE: 
INNOVATION IN OPEN SCIENCE, SOCIETY AND POLICY 99, 104 (Susanne Hecker et al. 
eds., 2018) (citing the works of Robert E. Kohler).  
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education and training, as well as access to the sophisticated physical 
resources that are often necessary to tinker at cellular and molecular 
levels. 
In the past few decades, the internet has helped break down 
many of these barriers at the same time that it has opened channels 
for DIY biologists to connect, consult, and collaborate with one 
another.81 Today, used or refurbished laboratory equipment can be 
purchased on eBay or Craigslist, obtained gratis on Freecycle, or even 
self-manufactured using 3D-printing protocols posted on the 
internet.82 As one biohacker explained, “[Y]ou can literally buy 
almost everything you need off of Ebay. .	.	. Other than that, the few 
things that I can’t buy, I build because I tend to build a lot of my own 
tools if I need to.”83 Another interviewee described a different 
strategy of purchasing equipment at deep discounts from 
biotechnology companies that have gone bankrupt.84 Meanwhile, free 
instruction is available in the form of scientific lectures uploaded to 
YouTube;85 courses offered on edX and Coursera and by other 
biohackers;86 protocols shared on OpenWetWare;87 and scientific 
 
 81. See DANIEL GRUSHKIN, TODD KUIKEN & PEIRS MILLET, WOODROW WILSON 
CTR., SEVEN MYTHS AND REALITIES ABOUT DO-IT-YOURSELF BIOLOGY 5 (2013), 
https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/7_myths_final.pdf [https://perma.cc/CX7W-
73D5] (providing a brief history of the “DIYbio movement”); Ikemoto, supra note 38, at 
547 (noting formative events of the DIY biology “movement,” including online 
publication of educational materials and the launch of the DIYbio.org message board).  
 82. Patrik D’haeseleer, How to Set Up Your Own DIY Bio Lab, MAKE: (Apr. 11, 
2017, 6:00 AM), https://makezine.com/2017/04/11/how-to-set-up-your-own-lab/ 
[https://perma.cc/G7HZ-ER9W]. Other sources of equipment are described in Elliot 
Roth, A Guide to DIYbio (Updated 2019): Almost Everything You Need to Know About 
Biohacking (with Links), MEDIUM (Feb. 16, 2019), https://medium.com/@ThatMrE/a-
guide-to-diybio-updated-2019-abd0956cdf74 [https://perma.cc/D4GD-4UAC]. 
 83. Telephone Interview with Justin Atkin, supra note 38. 
 84. Telephone Interview with Ryan Bethencourt, Partner, Babel Ventures, and CEO, 
Wild Earth, Inc. (Nov. 15, 2018) (on file with author); see also Andrew W. Torrance, 
Planted Obsolescence: Synagriculture and the Law, 48 IDAHO L. REV. 321, 345 (2012) 
(noting that DIY biology has been encouraged in part by bankruptcies in the 
biotechnology industry, which “resulted in abundant laboratory equipment available for 
purchase at steep discounts”).  
 85. See, e.g., AK Lectures, YOUTUBE (Aug. 4, 2016), https://www.youtube.com/user/
mathdude2012 [https://perma.cc/JNQ8-NQCA]; Shomu’s Biology, YOUTUBE (May 30, 
2016), https://www.youtube.com/user/TheFunsuman [https://perma.cc/M2SR-5SB7]. These 
lecture series were recommended by biohacker David Ishee. Telephone Interview with 
David Ishee, Owner, Midgard Kennels (Aug. 10, 2018) (on file with author).  
 86. See, e.g., BIOHACK ACAD., http://biohackacademy.github.io/ [https://perma.cc/
NLK2-4Q7P]; Biohacker 101 Class, ODIN, http://www.the-odin.com/biohacker-101-class/ 
[https://perma.cc/3NYS-V8JQ]; Principles of Synthetic Biology, EDX, https://www.edx.org/
course/principles-of-synthetic-biology [https://perma.cc/E7AW-C8SN].  
 87. OPENWETWARE, https://openwetware.org/wiki/Main_Page [https://perma.cc/2CD5-
M7XL].  
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manuscripts available from Sci-Hub, bioRxiv, and other open access 
libraries.88 
Numerous websites and online platforms are also now available 
to support project collaborations—in some cases among individuals 
who will never meet in person. For example, several years ago, seven 
individuals with a specific genetic variant codeveloped and executed a 
protocol to test the effect of different vitamin regimens on their 
homocysteine levels using the internet platform DIYgenomics.org.89 
As another example, individuals afflicted with amyotrophic lateral 
sclerosis (“ALS”) who met on the website PatientsLikeMe 
collaborated on testing the effect of lithium carbonate on their 
symptoms.90 
In 2008, DIYbio.org was formed to support the efforts of the 
growing communities of individuals seeking to access and do science 
outside of traditional scientific institutions.91 Among the group’s early 
achievements was its organization of two congresses that drafted 
codes of ethics for DIY biologists.92 More recently, DIYbio.org 
launched the DIYbiosphere for sharing information about relevant 
projects, organizations, and events around the world.93 
Today, there are over 5000 registered members of the 
DIYbio.org discussion forum.94 This represents just a subset of all 
 
 88. BIORXIV, https://www.biorxiv.org/ [https://perma.cc/C6UK-7DAL]; SCI-HUB, 
http://sci-hub.tw/ [https://perma.cc/M4RY-PN5V (staff-uploaded archive)]. We note, 
however, that Sci-Hub is a “pirate” website. 
 89. See Melanie Swan et al., Citizen Science Genomics as a Model for Crowdsourced 
Preventive Medicine Research, SOC’Y FOR PARTICIPATORY MED. (2010), 
https://participatorymedicine.org/journal/evidence/research/2010/12/23/citizen-science-genomics-
as-a-model-for-crowdsourced-preventive-medicine-research/ [https://perma.cc/X25X-FFYB].  
 90. See Paul Wicks et al., Accelerated Clinical Discovery Using Self-Reported 
Patient Data Collected Online and a Patient-Matching Algorithm, 29 NATURE 
BIOTECHNOLOGY 411, 411 (2011). 
 91. See An Institution for the Do-It-Yourself Biologist, DIYBIO, https://diybio.org/ 
[https://perma.cc/G9ZV-3C39]. 
 92. Codes, DIYBIO, https://diybio.org/codes/ [https://perma.cc/6X4G-FHWW]. 
 93. Jason Bobe, Announcing DIYbiosphere: An Open Source Project to Connect 
DIYbio Related Activities Worldwide, DIYBIO (Mar. 17, 2018), https://diybio.org/2018/03/
17/announcing-diybiosphere-an-open-source-project-to-connect-diybio-related-activities-
worldwide/ [https://perma.cc/6GUK-7ZE9]. Events featured on the website include the 
Global Summit on Community Biotechnology in Cambridge, Massachusetts, an annual 
gathering of DIY biologists and members of independent and community laboratories 
sponsored by the MIT Media Lab, GLOBAL COMMUNITY BIO SUMMIT, 
https://www.biosummit.org [https://perma.cc/96DL-7XS2], and Biohack the Planet in 
Oakland, California, an annual biohacking convention spearheaded by Dr. Zayner, 
BIOHACK PLANET, https://www.biohacktheplanet.com [https://perma.cc/J9YH-E8FD]. 
 94. See DIYbio, GOOGLE GROUPS, https://groups.google.com/forum/#!forum/diybio 
[https://perma.cc/967P-5X4V]. 
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DIY biology communities, which Brookings Institution estimated in 
2017 to include 30,000 “enthusiasts, followers, biohackers and citizen 
scientists” in the United States alone.95 
These communities have proven hard to characterize not only 
due to their size but also their significant diversity. The formal 
scientific training of DIY biologists ranges from participation only in 
high school coursework to completion of PhD programs.96 
Furthermore, DIY biologists have varied objectives that include 
learning about scientific processes, advancing scientific discovery, 
commercializing scientific solutions, using science as a medium for 
artistic expression, and challenging (or even disrupting) traditional 
scientific practices and norms.97 
To advance these objectives, some DIY biologists have turned to 
CRISPR. No data has been collected regarding who exactly is 
engaged in DIY CRISPR or when, where, or for what purposes it is 
being practiced. In the only published survey of DIY biologists 
conducted to date, which involved 359 respondents, the Wilson 
Center found that almost half of those who answered questions 
regarding the nature of their experiments reported genetically 
engineering bacteria or yeast.98 Respondents were not asked what 
techniques they used, but it is doubtful that any were using CRISPR 
because the survey was conducted in 2013 when CRISPR—whose 
potential to be used for gene editing was first detailed just one year 
earlier—was still relatively new.99 As described below, however, 
reports and anecdotal evidence indicate that in the past few years, 
CRISPR-enabled gene editing has become a common activity across 
DIY settings.100 
 
 95. Bart Kolodziejczyk, Do-It-Yourself Biology Shows Safety Risks of an Open Innovation 
Movement, BROOKINGS INST. (Oct. 9, 2017), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/techtank/2017/10/09/
do-it-yourself-biology-shows-safety-risks-of-an-open-innovation-movement/ [https://perma.cc/
2JEX-RRCB]. 
 96. See GRUSHKIN ET AL., supra note 81, at 6. 
 97. See id. at 4; Ikemoto, supra note 38, at 548–54. 
 98. GRUSHKIN ET AL., supra note 81, at 6, 10–11. It is unclear exactly how many of the 
359 total number of survey respondents answered these particular questions. Percentages 
of responses to each question were calculated using the number of respondents who 
answered that specific question as a denominator. Id. at 24. 
 99. See supra note 12. 
 100. See, e.g., Heidi Ledford, Biohackers Gear up for Genome Editing, 524 NATURE 
398, 398 (2015) (quoting one biohacker’s description of CRISPR as “the most amazing 
tool ever”); Kristen V. Brown, Inside the Garage Labs of DIY Gene Hackers, Whose 
Hobby May Terrify You, PROJECT EARTH (Mar. 29, 2016, 7:00 AM), 
https://projectearth.us/inside-the-garage-labs-of-diy-gene-hackers-whose-hobby-1796423884 
[https://perma.cc/R3JP-DKYL] [hereinafter Brown, Inside the Garage Labs] (observing 
that CRISPR has “galvanized the movement of DIY scientists who want to try their hand 
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B. CRISPR in DIY Biology Settings 
The settings in which DIY CRISPR occurs can broadly be 
described as private or communal. We define private settings as 
homes, apartments, garages, and other properties owned or leased by 
individuals. Communal settings are properties owned or leased by or 
on behalf of a (usually nonprofit) collective or entity. 
1.  Private Settings 
The DIY biology movement is said to have originated in homes 
and apartments, and private settings remain the focus of many media 
accounts of biohacking. This is perhaps not surprising given the 
remarkable sophistication of some private laboratories and the 
resourcefulness of those who built them. Examples of home biologists 
who have received considerable media attention include Sebastian 
Cocioba, a college dropout who built a wet laboratory in the spare 
bedroom of his parent’s Long Island City apartment, and David 
Ishee, a dog breeder from Mississippi who built a genetic-engineering 
laboratory in his shed.101 
Many home laboratories are outfitted with second-hand or self-
manufactured equipment, although other procurement options are 
available. For example, Dr. Zayner’s retail company, The ODIN, sells 
a complete genetic-engineering home-lab kit, which includes a 
thermocycler to amplify segments of DNA, for $1849.102 Meanwhile, 
biological materials can be obtained from fellow biohackers103 or 
purchased from supply companies.104 
Although information about how to set up a private laboratory is 
not hard to find,105 the number of such laboratories is not known. The 
 
at genetically modifying plants, insects, animals, and, someday, maybe even humans”); 
Ellen Jorgensen, DIY Community Can Do Interesting, Useful, Perfectly Respectable Things 
with CRISPR, STAT (Mar. 14, 2016), https://www.statnews.com/2016/03/14/crispr-do-it-
yourself/#jorgensen [https://perma.cc/V8FQ-8YNA] (describing intense interest in learning 
and using CRISPR techniques among members of a New York community laboratory).  
 101. See Brown, Inside the Garage Labs, supra note 100; Kristen V. Brown, Meet the 
Guy Biohacking Puppies to Make Them Glow in the Dark, SPLINTER (Sept. 28, 2016, 11:20 
AM), https://splinternews.com/meet-the-guy-biohacking-puppies-to-make-them-glow-in-
th-1793862258 [https://perma.cc/DW66-KSMU]. 
 102. Genetic Engineering Home Lab Kit, ODIN, http://www.the-odin.com/genetic-
engineering-home-lab-kit/ [https://perma.cc/6YB6-4F9W].  
 103. Brown, Inside the Garage Labs, supra note 100 (describing how a New York 
biohacker obtained CRISPR/Cas9 through the mail from a friend in Austria); Telephone 
Interview with Justin Atkin, supra note 38. 
 104. Telephone Interview with David Ishee, supra note 85; Telephone Interview with 
Gabriel Licina, supra note 38. 
 105. See, e.g., D’haeseleer, supra note 82. 
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Wilson Center survey found that 26% of respondents reporting the 
location(s) of their DIY work conducted experiments at home in 
addition to community, institutional, or academic laboratories or 
other community workspaces, and 8% conducted experiments 
exclusively at home.106 However, because the survey was distributed 
to individuals participating in online forums and known community 
leaders, the findings could have been biased toward networked 
individuals who might be less likely to conduct their experiments in 
private settings.107 
The extent to which CRISPR is used in private settings is also 
unknown. In the absence of data, the scope of these activities might 
be estimated from sales of laboratory equipment and materials to 
individuals with private laboratories. By late 2017, it was reported 
that The ODIN had sold over 1000 kits,108 but it is not known how 
many were CRISPR kits purchased for home use. Moreover, sales of 
The ODIN’s CRISPR kits that facilitate basic experiments involving 
bacteria and yeast109—which until recently were the only kits sold by 
the company110—may not reflect the actual gene-editing activities of 
individuals working in relatively sophisticated laboratories that they 
 
 106. GRUSHKIN ET AL., supra note 81, at 6–7, 9. 
 107. Id. at 24. 
 108. See Sneed, supra note 13. 
 109. For a short time, The ODIN sold a kit marketed as enabling consumers to 
genetically engineer yeast to make glow-in-the-dark beer. Stephanie M. Lee, DNA 
Biohackers Are Giving the FDA a Headache with Glow-In-The-Dark Booze, BUZZFEED 
NEWS (Dec. 6, 2016, 9:42 AM), https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/stephaniemlee/
biohacking-booze#.xeeD8r8Gp [https://perma.cc/DKE6-QUNX]. It stopped selling that 
kit after Dr. Zayner spoke with FDA officials who reportedly expressed concern that the 
yeast was an unsafe color additive for food. Id. Color additives are “material[s]” that 
“when added or applied to a food .	.	. [are] capable .	.	. of imparting color,” 21 U.S.C. 
§	321(t) (2012), and must be approved by the FDA as safe before marketing, id. §	379e. 
Several sources offer an overview of FDA requirements related to color additives. See, 
e.g., PETER BARTON HUTT, RICHARD A. MERRILL & LEWIS A. GROSSMAN, FOOD AND 
DRUG LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 617–26 (2013); see also Peter Barton Hutt, The State 
of Science at the Food and Drug Administration, 60 ADMIN. L. REV. 431, 447 (2008) 
(describing the status of the FDA’s review of color additives); cf. Lars Noah & Richard A. 
Merrill, Starting from Scratch?: Reinventing the Food Additive Approval Process, 78 B.U. 
L. REV. 329, 351 n.94 (1998) (explaining that Congress declined to exempt from FDA 
review those color additives that are “generally recognized as safe”). 
 110. In 2018, The ODIN began selling for the first time a kit to alter frog genomes that 
includes six live frogs, cages, and food. Frog Genetic Engineering Kit–Learn to Genetically 
Modify Animals, ODIN, http://www.the-odin.com/frog-ge-kit/ [https://perma.cc/BS49-
8RKV]. The ODIN also sells a plasmid that expresses Cas9 and a gRNA that targets the 
human myostatin gene, although it is not “injectable or meant for direct human use.” 
Human Myostatin Knock-Out Targeting CRISPR-Cas9 Plasmid, ODIN, http://www.the-
odin.com/human-myostatin-knock-out-targeting-crispr-cas9-plasmid/ [https://perma.cc/
S8YL-VANN]. 
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built on their own. Yet, the activities of these DIY biologists may be 
especially important to track to the extent they demonstrate more 
proficiency with CRISPR and potential for editing human genetic 
material.111 Others have observed that citizen bioscientists working in 
private settings may include those most suspicious of government 
authority and “likely to explore the margins of ethical or legal 
conduct.”112 
But even those who use CRISPR exclusively in private settings 
are not necessarily working in secret. Because biohackers’ access to 
materials and information is generally limited, consulting each other 
and sharing resources can be critical to the success of their 
experiments.113 It is therefore not surprising that only 6% of the 
Wilson Center survey respondents who answered the question, “What 
are your feelings about transparency and sharing your work?,” 
favored privacy, and of the 8% who reported conducting experiments 
exclusively at home, many, according to the authors, “avidly discuss 
their work online.”114 Such is the case, for example, with Dr. Zayner. 
Although he has conducted experiments behind closed blinds so as 
not to alarm his neighbors,115 Dr. Zayner also has invited friends and 
journalists to observe his work in person and regularly discusses and 
posts videos of his activities on his blog and YouTube channel.116 
2.  Communal Settings 
As an alternative to private settings, some citizen bioscientists 
work in community laboratories, which provide members access to 
 
 111. A Stanford University infectious disease expert has expressed concern that use of 
even basic CRISPR kits “‘will help enable users to become proficient more generally with 
this technology,’ .	.	. so that they could someday become skilled enough to use advanced 
tools to introduce less benign genes.” Lisa M. Krieger, Playing God at Home with a Gene 
Editing Kit, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 10, 2016, at 3. 
 112. CTR. FOR GLOB. SEC. RESEARCH, LAWRENCE LIVERMORE NAT’L LAB., 
INDEPENDENT BIOTECHNOLOGY: THE INNOVATION-REGULATION DILEMMA 7 (2016), 
https://cgsr.llnl.gov/content/assets/docs/Independent_Biotechnology_Workshop_Summary
NOV2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/KN3F-TNWJ]. 
 113. Telephone Interview with David Ishee, supra note 85; see also CTR. FOR GLOB. 
SEC. RESEARCH, supra note 112, at 7 (noting that much of biotechnology is collaborative 
in nature so isolation can be an impediment to DIY biology). 
 114. See GRUSHKIN ET AL., supra note 81, at 8, 15. The number of individuals 
responding to the question regarding one’s preference for transparency was not reported. 
 115. See Krieger, supra note 111. 
 116. SCI. ART BEAUTY, http://www.josiahzayner.com/ [https://perma.cc/R5VQ-BJAG]; 
Josiah Zayner, Homo Sapien Mutagensis, YOUTUBE (Jan. 18, 2017), 
https://www.youtube.com/channel/UC-aCKd4djOAf_0BzyUMJ5FA [https://perma.cc/
7KH3-D657]. 
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laboratory space, materials, and instruction.117 In contrast to private 
settings, much is known about community laboratories and the gene-
editing activities occurring within them. There are an estimated fifty 
community laboratories and similar biohacking spaces dispersed 
throughout the United States,118 although they appear to be 
concentrated on the East and West Coasts.119 Some of the oldest and 
most well-established laboratories include Genspace in Brooklyn, 
New York;120 Baltimore Under Ground Science Space (“BUGSS”) in 
Baltimore, Maryland;121 BioCurious in Santa Clara, California;122 and 
Counter Culture Labs in Oakland, California.123 
Most community laboratories are run by small teams that include 
at least one professionally trained scientist, and their members 
represent a spectrum of ages, professions, scientific backgrounds, and 
commercial intentions. In part due to limited funds, community 
laboratories are sometimes located in industrial parks or warehouse 
districts or share space with nonscientific groups.124 Furthermore, like 
home laboratories, community laboratories generally are outfitted 
with second-hand equipment, although unlike home laboratories, 
 
 117. DIY biology also takes place in traditional scientific settings, which encompass 
academic, commercial, and government laboratories. GRUSHKIN ET AL., supra note 81, at 
6–7. This Article does not address these activities because they are subject to many of the 
well-known oversight mechanisms that govern scientific work in those settings. Cf. CTR. 
FOR GLOB. SEC. RESEARCH, supra note 112, at 6 (noting that scientists working in 
institutional settings, whether or not federally funded, are subject to formal and ad hoc 
regulatory mechanisms, as well as institutional norms and liabilities, “that make it more 
likely that many ‘eyes’ will scrutinize a project during planning and execution—and 
intervene if necessary”). 
 118. Kolodziejczyk, supra note 95. 
 119. See DIYBIOSPHERE, http://sphere.diybio.org/ [https://perma.cc/5V5K-FXL7] 
(providing a listing and map of community laboratories). 
 120. GENSPACE, https://www.genspace.org/ [https://perma.cc/YBQ8-9UPA]. Founded 
in 2009, Genspace describes itself as “the world’s first community lab.” Id. 
 121. BALT. UNDER GROUND SCI. SPACE, http://www.bugssonline.org/ [https://perma.cc/
7BJG-7NNS]. 
 122. BIOCURIOUS, http://biocurious.org/ [https://perma.cc/M5YM-5P8G]. 
 123. COUNTER CULTURE LABS, https://www.counterculturelabs.org/ [https://perma.cc/
8H6V-TA63]. 
 124. For example, BUGSS shared spaced in its early years, Lisa Z. Scheifele & Thomas 
Burkett, The First Three Years of a Community Lab: Lessons Learned and Ways Forward, 
17 J. MICROBIOLOGY & BIOLOGY EDUC. 81, 83 (2016), while Counter Culture Labs is 
housed in Omni Commons, a community center in Oakland that is home to eleven other 
collectives, OMNI COMMONS, https://omnicommons.org/index.html# [https://perma.cc/
L9UQ-JBHH]. 
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such equipment might be donated directly to them by academic or 
commercial laboratories.125 
Although each community laboratory has a distinct ethos, a 
common objective is to promote education and experimentation.126 
Thus many community laboratories offer instruction on laboratory 
techniques and specific areas of scientific interest. Among these 
educational programs, training in the use of CRISPR with bacteria 
and yeast has become popular in recent years. For example, a 
CRISPR class series is offered multiple times a year at both 
Genspace127 and BUGSS.128 
Community laboratories also offer members the opportunity to 
contribute to community research or conduct their own research 
using laboratory-owned or approved equipment, disposables, and 
biological materials. Some of these research projects involve 
CRISPR. For example, BioCurious and Counter Culture Labs are co-
leading a project that uses CRISPR called Real Vegan Cheese, which 
aims to turn yeast into milk protein factories.129 Members are also 
using CRISPR on their own to edit bacteria and yeast genomes.130 
Although nonmembers generally have access to courses and 
lectures, only members may conduct research at community 
laboratories. Sometimes access is tiered by membership type. At 
Genspace, for example, “community members” may participate in 
community projects, “individual members” may conduct independent 
research, and “premium members” may use the laboratory for 
 
 125. For example, HiveBio, a community laboratory in Seattle, solicits equipment 
donations. Equipment Wish List, HIVEBIO, https://hivebiolab.wordpress.com/equipment-
wish-list/ [https://perma.cc/WB9T-U7XE]. 
 126. See Scheifele & Burkett, supra note 124, at 82. 
 127. Classes, GENSPACE, https://www.genspace.org/classes/ [https://perma.cc/W249-
66GJ] (describing a four-part course titled “Genome Editing with CRISPR-Cas9”). 
 128. Build-a-Gene Course (Now More CRISPR), BALT. UNDER GROUND SCI. SPACE, 
http://www.bugssonline.org/build-a-gene-now-more-crispr/ [https://perma.cc/CJ5U-M5PX]. 
 129. REAL VEGAN CHEESE, https://realvegancheese.org/ [https://perma.cc/TLL5-
52AB]. 
 130. See, e.g., Sneed, supra note 13 (describing the independent CRISPR projects of a 
BioCurious member). 
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entrepreneurial purposes.131 Fees for these memberships range from 
$100 to $800 per month.132 
Whether working on community or individual projects, members 
are expected to comply with laboratory policies, which might be 
developed with input from members. The content of these policies 
varies, but most laboratories have adopted rules related to safety that 
endeavor to strike an appropriate balance between minimizing 
potential risks to members and helping members realize their 
educational, expressive, and scientific objectives. 
C. Potential Risks and Benefits of DIY CRISPR 
While the risks of CRISPR-enabled gene editing conducted by 
professional scientists in institutional settings are the subject of a 
robust literature and ongoing public conversations,133 uses of CRISPR 
by citizen bioscientists present additional human health and societal 
considerations. Assessment of these risks encompasses three 
questions: What are the potential outcomes? How likely are they? 
What are the consequences?134 
Focusing on negative outcomes related to safety, the use of 
CRISPR in ex vivo experimentation poses health risks to citizen 
bioscientists performing this work that are likely minimal and not 
unlike those present in other laboratory work involving mammalian 
cells. Using CRISPR to edit human cells in vivo, however, poses risks 
that include immunological reaction, infection, and other unintended 
health effects that may be more likely to occur when conducted by 
 
 131. Join the Lab, GENSPACE, https://www.genspace.org/join-the-lab/ [https://perma.cc/
5WEZ-8JFB]. BUGSS also recognizes various membership categories, including a 
membership category for students and teachers. BALTIMORE UNDER GROUND SCIENCE 
SPACE (BUGSS) MEMBERSHIP APPLICATION AND AGREEMENT 2 [hereinafter BUGSS 
MEMBERSHIP APPLICATION], http://www.bugssonline.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/
BUGSSmembership-agreement.pdf [https://perma.cc/A7JT-FD5S]. 
 132. Join the Lab, supra note 131. Some community laboratories also offer ways to 
reduce membership fees. See, e.g., BUGSS MEMBERSHIP APPLICATION, supra note 131, 
at 2 (offering a “starving hacker” membership option); Join Counter Culture!, COUNTER 
CULTURE LABS, https://www.counterculturelabs.org/join.html [https://perma.cc/F2SD-
92S9] (offering sponsored memberships at reduced rates). 
 133. See supra notes 22–28 and accompanying text. 
 134. Stanley Kaplan & B. John Garrick, On the Quantitative Definition of Risk, 1 RISK 
ANALYSIS 11, 13 (1981); see also Ortwin Renn, Concepts of Risk: A Classification, in 
SOCIAL THEORIES OF RISK 77 (Sheldon Krimsky & Dominic Golding eds., 1981) 
(conceptualizing risk to also include ways that undesirable outcomes might come to pass). 
Both definitions are cited by the National Academies’ Committee on Future 
Biotechnology Products and Opportunities to Enhance Capabilities of the Biotechnology 
Regulatory System. NAT’L ACADS. OF SCIS., ENG’G, & MED., PREPARING FOR FUTURE 
PRODUCTS OF BIOTECHNOLOGY 69, 107 (2017).  
97 N.C. L. REV. 1399 (2019) 
2019] DIY CRISPR 1425 
individuals who do not have extensive experience with this technique 
or knowledge of the underlying science.135 In addition, individuals 
who attempt gene editing on themselves in an effort to cure disease or 
treat disease symptoms could suffer negative health outcomes if they 
stop taking prescribed medications or forego treatments known to be 
safe and effective.136 It is possible that some of these individuals will 
not appreciate the health risks of their gene-editing activities, and 
even if they do, there is the danger that they might be pressured by 
others into accepting those risks. Finally, self-experimentation does 
not, by design, yield generalizable information and so its outcomes 
are of limited usefulness to population health. Yet dissemination of 
information about those outcomes could lead others to try such 
experiments based on a misunderstanding that they are likely to 
achieve similar outcomes. 
In assessing the likelihood that these undesirable outcomes will 
come to pass, it is important to note that there have been few reports 
of human applications of DIY CRISPR thus far. The majority of 
CRISPR activities in home and community laboratories appear to be 
limited to editing bacteria and yeast genomes.137 Aside from Dr. 
Zayner’s highly publicized self-injection, there are also few known 
instances in which individuals have self-experimented with CRISPR, 
and all of them involved somatic cells.138 While discussions on a 
biohacking forum indicate interest in self-experimenting with 
CRISPR, these discussions are infrequent and might not reflect the 
activities that posters actually have undertaken or will undertake in 
the near future.139 
 
 135. For a description of the risks of immunological reactions, infection, and potential 
on-target and off-target effects of CRISPR, see supra note 19 and accompanying text. 
 136. Cf. Jessica Lussenhop, Why I Injected Myself with an Untested Gene Therapy, 
BBC NEWS (Nov. 21, 2017), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-41990981 
[https://perma.cc/UQ8B-T2TJ] (describing the live-streamed self-injection of an 
unregulated HIV therapy by a biohacker who had stopped taking conventional 
antiretroviral drugs two years earlier).  
 137. See supra notes 98, 109, 129–130 and accompanying text. 
 138. While it was reported that one biohacker added DNA constructs to a sample of 
his own sperm, Antonio Regalado, The DIY Designer Baby Project Funded with Bitcoin, 
MIT TECH. REV. (Feb. 1, 2019), https://www.technologyreview.com/s/612838/the-
transhumanist-diy-designer-baby-funded-with-bitcoin/ [https://perma.cc/3KWU-5JTD], he 
did not use CRISPR to conduct germline editing, Email from David Ishee, Owner, 
Midgard Kennels, to Christi Guerrini, Assistant Professor, Baylor Coll. of Med. (Mar. 1, 
2019, 3:09 PM) (on file with author). 
 139. For example, in an online discussion of self-experimentation using CRISPR, one 
poster described plans for self-experimentation using CRISPR to be performed by the 
person and “close friends.” Cha0sthe0rist, Playing with Viruses, BIOHACK.ME (Mar. 2018), 
https://forum.biohack.me/index.php?p=/discussion/comment/26480#Comment_26480 
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Still, there is reason to believe that instances of attempted self-
experimentation with CRISPR might increase in coming years. In 
particular, the recent news that a Chinese researcher used CRISPR to 
alter the genomes of twin babies in an effort to confer HIV resistance 
could embolden some DIY biologists to attempt more human 
CRISPR experiments.140 Summarizing the implications of the news, 
which came on the eve of the Second International Summit on 
Human Genome Editing in November 2018, a Harvard geneticist 
remarked that “the genie [is] really out of the bottle.”141 Increased 
human applications of CRISPR by citizen bioscientists generally will 
heighten concerns about the associated risks, especially if DIY 
CRISPR experiments are conducted on germ cells because the 
genomic alterations or disruptions will be heritable and any harmful 
effects may be more difficult to identify and mitigate in DIY settings 
than in traditional settings. 
Yet there are benefits to human applications of DIY CRISPR 
that include the potential for expanding scientific knowledge.142 
Recent examples of important breakthroughs by DIY biologists 
include the development of an inexpensive diagnostic system to 
detect malaria from a drop of blood and a genetic test to determine 
vulnerability to hemochromatosis.143 Given the realities of the modern 
research environment, some of these breakthroughs might not occur 
in traditional research settings if, for example, the investigation is not 
considered “fundable” because it is too speculative or has limited 
translational potential. In addition, DIY CRISPR has the potential to 
increase genetic literacy, where public education about genetics has 
been identified as both a major challenge and a priority given the 
 
[https://perma.cc/X2PY-2T48]. In another discussion, a poster described efforts to improve 
on Dr. Zayner’s CRISPR/Cas9 myostatin knockout materials and asked individuals to 
contact the poster if interested in self-experimenting with them. LifeForAll, Myostatin 
Knock-out and More, BIOHACK.ME (Mar. 2018), https://forum.biohack.me/index.php?p=/
discussion/comment/26268#Comment_26268 [https://perma.cc/FVY7-LHZZ].  
 140. Cyranoski & Ledford, supra note 27. The news also serves as a reminder that such 
experiments may not be disclosed to the public until long after they are completed. 
 141. Sharon Begley, Claim of CRISPR’d Baby Girls Stuns Genome Editing Summit, 
STAT (Nov. 26, 2018), https://www.statnews.com/2018/11/26/claim-of-crispred-baby-girls-
stuns-genome-editing-summit/ [https://perma.cc/M55X-PAHQ] (quoting Dr. George 
Church). 
 142. Cf. Telephone Interview with Keoni Gandall, Research Assistant, Stanford Univ. 
(Sept. 1, 2018) (on file with author) (“I feel strongly that the future of biotechnology is not 
going to be made by large companies making proprietary products. It’s going to be 
influenced and created .	.	. by grassroots movements, the individuals who are trying to help 
each other.”). 
 143. Sharona Hoffman, Citizen Science: The Law and Ethics of Public Access to 
Medical Big Data, 30 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1741, 1755–56 (2015). 
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increasingly personalized approach to medicine in the United 
States.144 
Finally, self-experimentation with CRISPR is consistent with the 
cultural value that Americans generally place on allowing individuals 
to make decisions concerning their own bodies.145 Notions of bodily 
freedom have particular salience in the context of patients with 
serious or terminal conditions who lack traditional treatment 
options—either because there are no validated therapies or those 
therapies that are validated are too expensive or inaccessible for 
other reasons.146 Indeed, citizen bioscientists sometimes emphasize 
the challenges faced by such patients in conversations about the 
potential benefits of DIY biology.147 In the case of therapies that are 
 
 144. See, e.g., Lynn G. Dressler et al., Genomics Education for the Public: Perspectives 
of Genomic Researchers and ELSI Advisors, 18 GENETIC TESTING & MOLECULAR 
BIOMARKERS 131, 131–32, 138 (2014). 
 145. See generally Lewis A. Grossman, The Origins of American Health Libertarianism, 
13 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 76 (2013) (providing an overview of therapeutic 
libertarianism attitudes between the American Revolution and the Civil War). Notions of 
bodily freedom animate other, sometimes overlapping, DIY movements. See, e.g., Anna 
Wexler, The Social Context of “Do-It-Yourself” Brain Stimulation: Neurohackers, 
Biohackers, and Lifehackers, FRONTIERS HUM. NEUROSCIENCE, May 2017, at 1, 2–3. 
Although bodily freedom has deep roots in American jurisprudence, there is no absolute 
legal right to bodily freedom. See Meghan Boone, The Autonomy Hierarchy, 22 TEX. 
J.C.L. & C.R. 1, 17–19 (2016); cf. Abigail All. for Better Access to Developmental Drugs 
v. von Eschenbach, 495 F.3d 695, 697 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (declining to find a constitutional 
right for terminally ill patients to access experimental drugs). 
 146. Famous examples of movements premised, at least in part, on the intersection of 
bodily freedom and serious illness include AIDS activists’ protests of the FDA in the 
1980s, seeking quicker access to promising but unproven drugs intended for HIV—after 
which the Agency updated its policies—and more recently, the “right to try” movement 
seeking a pathway for patients to access unapproved drugs without FDA authorization, 
which ultimately led to the 2018 enactment of a federal law creating such a pathway. See, 
e.g., Lewis A. Grossman, AIDS Activists, FDA Regulation, and the Amendment of 
America’s Drug Constitution, 42 AM. J.L. & MED. 687, 688 (2016); Holly Fernandez 
Lynch, Patricia J. Zettler & Ameet Sarpatwari, Promoting Patient Interests in 
Implementing the Federal Right to Try Act, 320 JAMA 869, 869 (2018); Patricia J. Zettler 
& Henry T. Greely, The Strange Allure of State “Right to Try” Laws, 174 JAMA 
INTERNAL MED. 1885, 1885 (2014). 
 147. See, e.g., Josiah Zayner (@jzayner), INSTAGRAM (Dec. 17, 2018), 
https://www.instagram.com/p/Brf0pOKFl9z/ [https://perma.cc/7QGF-XUBU]; see also 
David Ishee, The People Who Fall Through the Cracks, ANTISENSE (Nov. 12, 2018), 
http://theantisense.com/2018/11/12/the-people-who-fall-through-the-cracks/ [https://perma.cc/
L9AV-LBQ9] (explaining that individuals with genetic diseases and parents of children 
with genetic diseases regularly approach biohackers who have appeared in the media to 
ask for help finding cures); Josiah Zayner, Biohack the Planet Day 2018 – Day 2-Sept 1, 
YOUTUBE (Sept. 1, 2018), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CHQleUE-Iwk 
[https://perma.cc/WPX3-FMRY] [hereinafter Zayner, Biohack the Planet] (conversation 
between Tristan Roberts and one of the authors—Patricia J. Zettler—including discussion 
of this issue).  
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known to be effective and relatively easy to manufacture, DIY 
biology might provide an avenue for patients who cannot afford the 
marketed therapies to make their own.148 Moreover, and regardless of 
whether DIY CRISPR ultimately produces safe and effective 
therapies, or products with enhancing or aesthetic uses, it may have 
societal value as a medium for political and creative expression.149 
III.  OVERSIGHT OF DIY CRISPR 
The oversight of DIY CRISPR should aim to strike an 
appropriate balance between preventing its potential harms and 
promoting its potential educational, expressive, and scientific 
benefits. Assessment of this balance requires an understanding of the 
relevant oversight mechanisms. To that end, this part describes the 
external legal and regulatory mechanisms, as well as the internal 
mechanisms adopted by DIY biology communities and suppliers of 
biological materials, that apply or potentially could apply to DIY 
CRISPR. 
A. External Oversight 
Many reports of DIY CRISPR note that its regulation by federal 
and state authorities is an important issue, but the scope of regulation 
has not yet been examined in detail. This section provides this critical 
information by explaining how, exactly, existing regulations relevant 
to biotechnology and scientific research apply to DIY CRISPR. The 
specific regulatory schemes that are addressed are: (1) the regulation 
of biological drug products by the FDA; (2) the regulation of genetic 
research by the National Institutes of Health (“NIH”) and state and 
local governments; (3) the regulation of clinical laboratories by the 
Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (“CMS”); (4) federal 
 
 148. See, e.g., Gallegos et al., supra note 32, at 1211. Marketed therapies can be very 
expensive. For example, the three currently approved gene therapies each cost hundreds 
of thousands of dollars. Rachel Salzman et al., Addressing the Value of Gene Therapy and 
Enhancing Patient Access to Transformative Treatments, 26 MOLECULAR THERAPY 2717, 
2718 (2018) (stating that approved therapies cost between $373,000 to $850,000). Of 
course, drug pricing and health care costs more generally are pressing and complicated 
problems that ideally would be solved through reforms to the overall system rather than 
through patients attempting individual work-arounds. See generally Aaron S. Kesselheim, 
Jerry Avorn & Ameet Sarpatwari, The High Cost of Prescription Drugs in the United 
States: Origins and Prospects for Reform, 316 JAMA 858 (2016); Rachel E. Sachs, 
Delinking Reimbursement, 102 MINN. L. REV. 2307 (2018). 
 149. See NUFFIELD COUNCIL 2016, supra note 29, at 100 (describing the use of 
CRISPR in bioactivism and bioart). 
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and state protections of human subjects in research; (5) federal patent 
law; and (6) state tort law. 
This section concludes that the standard account that regulation 
is largely dependent on federal funding does not tell the whole 
story.150 The FDA in particular has broad authority to regulate a 
number of activities relevant to DIY human gene editing, and state 
tort law is a potentially important constraint on activities that cause 
harm. To date, however, these regulations remain almost entirely 
untested in DIY biology contexts. 
1.  FDA Requirements 
The FDA is perhaps the most obvious choice to regulate DIY 
CRISPR because of the Agency’s expertise in evaluating the safety 
and effectiveness of medical technologies.151 It does indeed have the 
potential to reach a variety of DIY CRISPR activities through its 
authority to regulate the “articles”—that is, the products, materials, 
or things—used in these activities.152 In November 2017, the FDA 
stated that it “considers any use of CRISPR/Cas9 gene editing in 
humans to be gene therapy,” including self-administered materials 
and materials intended for performance-enhancing and aesthetic uses, 
subject to the requirements for biological drug products.153 These 
 
 150. See, e.g., CTR. FOR GLOB. SEC. RESEARCH, supra note 112, at 4–5 (explaining that 
risk and regulation of biotechnologies generally “rel[y] on the control of federal funding as 
a mechanism to enforce ‘voluntary’ standards and guidelines for ensuring public health, 
human subject protections, and environmental safeguards”). 
 151. See EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, MODERNIZING THE REGULATORY 
SYSTEM FOR BIOTECHNOLOGY PRODUCTS: FINAL VERSION OF THE 2017 UPDATE TO 
THE COORDINATED FRAMEWORK FOR THE REGULATION OF BIOTECHNOLOGY 1 
(2017), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/microsites/ostp/2017_
coordinated_framework_update.pdf [https://perma.cc/U4VE-5TCS]; see also Alex 
Philippidis, Gene Therapy Briefs, 28 HUM. GENE THERAPY CLINICAL DEV. 1, 1 (2017) 
(describing the FDA’s “product-focused, science-based regulatory policy” approach to 
gene-editing technologies and applications); cf. Richard A. Merrill, The Architecture of 
Government Regulation of Medical Products, 82 VA. L. REV. 1753, 1826 (1996) (explaining 
that the FDA’s position is that the “fundamental principles underlying evaluation of any 
therapeutic intervention, whether it is a drug [or a] device .	.	. are the same” (quoting 
FINAL REPORT OF THE FDA COMMITTEE FOR CLINICAL REVIEW (1993), reprinted in 
SUBCOMM. ON OVERSIGHT & INVESTIGATIONS, HOUSE COMM. ON ENERGY & 
COMMERCE, 103D CONG., LESS THAN THE SUM OF ITS PARTS: REFORMS NEEDED IN 
THE ORGANIZATION, MANAGEMENT, AND RESOURCES OF THE FOOD AND DRUG 
ADMINISTRATION’S CENTER FOR DEVICES AND RADIOLOGICAL HEALTH 98, 105 
(Comm. Print 1993))).  
 152. Cf. 21 U.S.C. §	321 (2012) (defining the “articles” within the FDA’s jurisdiction). 
 153. Information About Self-Administration of Gene Therapy, FDA (Nov. 21, 2017), 
https://www.fda.gov/BiologicsBloodVaccines/CellularGeneTherapyProducts/ucm586343.htm 
[https://perma.cc/J7Z6-FWJA]. 
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requirements are extensive and include, among other things, good 
laboratory practice requirements for preclinical research, 
requirements for FDA authorization of clinical trials (which must be 
well designed and conducted in compliance with human research 
subject protections), good manufacturing practices, postapproval 
safety monitoring and restrictions on advertising and promotion, and, 
in some cases, risk-mitigation programs.154 Likely most important for 
DIY biologists, and put most simply, biological drug products—
including gene therapies intended for self-administration—cannot 
legally be sold without the FDA’s authorization.155 
Notwithstanding the FDA’s clear statement on the use of 
CRISPR in humans, there are nuances to the scope of the FDA’s 
jurisdiction that are important for understanding which DIY CRISPR 
materials the Agency can regulate.156 First, the key to understanding 
what counts as a biological drug product is determining the “intended 
use” of the material. This is because the Federal Food, Drug, and 
Cosmetic Act (“FDCA”) broadly defines drugs subject to FDA 
jurisdiction as “articles intended for use in the diagnosis, cure, 
mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease in man or other 
animals” or “intended to affect the structure or any function of the 
 
 154. See, e.g., Efthimios Parasidis, Patients over Politics: Addressing Legislative Failure 
in the Regulation of Medical Products, 2011 WIS. L. REV. 929, 937 (describing the FDA as 
“responsible for analyzing information related to a drug’s risks and benefits throughout 
the lifecycle of a drug”). 
 155. 21 U.S.C. §§	331(d), 355(a), (i) (2012); 42 U.S.C. §	262(a) (2012). 
 156. There are similar, although not identical, issues with respect to the scope of the 
FDA’s jurisdiction over other emerging DIY or direct-to-consumer technologies. See, e.g., 
Dianne Hoffmann et al., Improving Regulation of Microbiota Transplants, 358 SCIENCE 
1390, 1390 (2017); Margaret F. Riley & Bernat Olle, FDA’s Pathway for Regulation of 
FMT: Not So Fraught, 2 J.L. & BIOSCIENCES 742, 743–44 (2015); Rachel E. Sachs & 
Carolyn A. Edelstein, Ensuring the Safe and Effective FDA Regulation of Fecal Microbiota 
Transplantation, 2 J.L. & BIOSCIENCES 396, 397–98 (2015); Anna Wexler, A Pragmatic 
Analysis of the Regulation of Consumer Transcranial Direct Current Stimulation (TDCS) 
Devices in the United States, 2 J.L. & BIOSCIENCES 669, 671–73 (2015); Patricia J. Zettler, 
What Lies Ahead for FDA Regulation of tDCS Products?, 3 J.L. & BIOSCIENCES 318, 322–
23 (2016); see also Barbara J. Evans, The Limits of FDA’s Authority to Regulate Clinical 
Research Involving High-Throughput DNA Sequencing, 70 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 259, 261–
65 (2015) (considering FDA regulation of DNA sequencing); Barbara J. Evans, The First 
Amendment Right to Speak About the Human Genome, 16 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 549, 551 
(2014) (exploring “whether the First Amendment can help clear away old laws that limit 
genomic speech”); Erika Lietzan, Access Before Evidence and the Price of FDA’s New 
Drug Authority, 53 U. RICH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2019) (manuscript at 19–24), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3346574 (exploring the implications of 
applying FDA approval authorities to fecal microbiota materials); W. Nicholson Price II, 
Regulating Black-Box Medicine, 116 MICH. L. REV. 421, 438 (2017) (considering FDA 
regulation of medical algorithms). 
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body of man or other animals.”157 The Agency can take the position 
that any use of CRISPR in humans makes those CRISPR materials a 
biological drug product because gene editing is, by design, intended to 
affect the structure or function of the body. Indeed, since 1986 the 
FDA has said that human gene therapies are biological drug 
products.158 
The question in DIY contexts, however, will be which CRISPR 
materials and kits are intended for use in humans and nonhuman 
animals given that many materials and kits are expressly described as 
intended for basic discovery or educational uses. Importantly, the 
FDA is not limited to considering express, public statements in 
making this determination.159 Courts have concluded, and the FDA 
has agreed, that the Agency may consider “any relevant source” of 
evidence of a product’s intended use.160 Most controversially, the 
FDA has taken the position that, in certain circumstances, it can rely 
on a manufacturer’s, seller’s, or distributor’s knowledge about how 
consumers intend to use the product as evidence of statutory intended 
 
 157. 21 U.S.C. §	321(g)(1) (2012) (emphasis added). Within this broad category of 
drugs, certain types of items—any “virus, therapeutic serum, toxin, antitoxin, or analogous 
product applicable to the prevention, treatment or cure of diseases or injuries of man”—
must also meet the definition of a biological product under the Public Health Service Act 
(“PHSA”). 21 C.F.R. §	600.3 (2018). Different statutory and regulatory provisions govern 
the regulation of biological and traditional, small-molecule drug products—for example, 
the approval standard for biological drug products is “safe, pure, and potent,” while that 
for small-molecule drugs focuses on safety and effectiveness. 42 U.S.C. §	262(i) (2012). But 
the FDA has interpreted many of the requirements to be essentially the same. This Article 
therefore focuses on the statutory and regulatory requirements for the more broadly 
defined drugs, rather than biological products. 
 158. Statement of Policy for Regulating Biotechnology Products, 51 Fed. Reg. 23,309, 
23,311 (June 26, 1986); Application of Current Statutory Authorities to Human Somatic 
Cell Therapy Products and Gene Therapy Products, 58 Fed. Reg. 53,248, 53,249 (Oct. 14, 
1993). 
 159. See 21 C.F.R. §	201.128 (2018). 
 160. See, e.g., Nat’l Nutritional Foods Ass’n v. Mathews, 557 F.2d 325, 334 (2d Cir. 
1977) (“[T]he FDA is not bound by the manufacturer’s subjective claims of intent .	.	.	. 
Such intent also may be derived or inferred from labeling, promotional material, 
advertising, and ‘any other relevant source.’”); Clarification of When Products Made or 
Derived from Tobacco are Regulated as Drugs, Devices, or Combination Products, 82 
Fed. Reg. 2193, 2199 (Jan. 9, 2017) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pts. 201, 801, and 1100) 
(“[T]he Agency may look to any relevant source to determine intended use.”); cf. FDA v. 
Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 156 (2000) (rejecting the FDA’s 
attempt to regulate tobacco products as drugs and devices, without disagreeing with the 
argument that the tobacco products’ design was evidence of their intended use). For more 
detailed discussion of the kinds of evidence that the FDA might rely on to demonstrate a 
product’s intended use, see, for example, Patricia J. Zettler, Natalie Hemmerich & Micah 
L. Berman, Closing the Regulatory Gap for Synthetic Nicotine Products, 59 B.C. L. REV. 
1933, 1952–70 (2018). 
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use.161 Therefore, even if a person or company manufacturing, selling, 
or distributing DIY CRISPR products expressly describes them as 
intended for educational or basic science uses, the FDA might rely on 
(or try to rely on), for example, elements of product design that 
suggest an intended human use,162 online videos of company 
executives using the products on themselves,163 or even mere 
knowledge that consumers are acquiring the products for self-
experimentation as evidence that the materials are “gene therapies” 
intended for human use.164 
A second relevant nuance to the FDA’s authority over DIY 
CRISPR materials and kits is that the Agency has jurisdiction over 
only those products that move in interstate commerce or include a 
component that moves in interstate commerce.165 In most contexts, 
the requirement that a product or one of its components have moved 
in interstate commerce does not significantly limit FDA jurisdiction. 
Modern supply chains are complex, and products and their 
components generally travel across state and national lines at many 
points.166 For example, DIY CRISPR products sold through a website 
to consumers all over the United States or the world would clearly be 
products moving in interstate commerce such that the FDA would 
have jurisdiction.167 But the connection with interstate commerce 
need not be so obvious for the FDA to have jurisdiction. For instance, 
 
 161. Whether the Agency can rely on manufacturer, seller, and distributor knowledge 
of consumer intent is at the heart of a dispute over the FDA’s 2017 attempt to revise its 
regulatory definition of intended use. As of the time of writing this Article, the Agency’s 
intended use regulations continue to permit it to rely on such knowledge as evidence of 
intended use. §	201.128; Clarification of When Products Made or Derived from Tobacco 
are Regulated as Drugs, Devices, or Combination Products, 82 Fed. Reg. at 2198, 2200 
(providing the January 2017 Final Rule); Clarification of When Products Made or Derived 
from Tobacco are Regulated as Drugs, Devices, or Combination Products; Further 
Delayed Effective Date; Request for Comments, 82 Fed. Reg. 14,319, 14,320 (Mar. 20, 
2017) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pts. 201, 801, and 1100) (delaying the effective date of 
the January 2017 Final Rule). 
 162. Cf. Clarification of When Products Made or Derived from Tobacco are Regulated 
as Drugs, Devices, or Combination Products, 82 Fed. Reg. at 2208 (describing 
circumstances in which the FDA has relied on product design as evidence of intended 
use). 
 163. Cf. Brown, Genetically Engineering Yourself, supra note 3 (describing Dr. 
Zayner’s live-streamed self-injection). 
 164. See §	201.128. 
 165. 21 U.S.C. §	331 (2012). Moving in interstate commerce requires crossing state, 
territory, or national borders at some point. Id. §	321(b). 
 166. Cf. id. §	379a (providing that the FDA may presume the necessary connection 
between a product and interstate commerce). 
 167. Cf. ODIN, supra note 8 (selling biohacking products for various uses, including 
educational and nonhuman animal uses). 
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interventions derived from patients’ own stem cells—but including an 
ingredient that had previously crossed state lines—have the necessary 
intersection with interstate commerce.168 
Moreover—and importantly for DIY biologists who distribute or 
provide materials to one another—money likely does not need to 
change hands to trigger FDA jurisdiction in many instances.169 Most 
provisions of the FDCA do not expressly require a sale to trigger 
FDA jurisdiction. For example, the FDCA prohibits introducing into 
interstate commerce any adulterated, misbranded, or unapproved 
drug without reference to a “sale.”170 
The FDA therefore could reasonably conclude that many 
manufacturers, sellers, or distributors of DIY CRISPR materials and 
kits intended for human (or nonhuman animal) use are or include 
biological drug products that fall within the Agency’s jurisdiction. The 
 
 168. United States v. Regenerative Scis., LLC, 741 F.3d 1314, 1320 (D.C. Cir. 2014); see 
also United States v. Allgyer, No. Civil Action No. 11-02651, 2012 WL 355261, at *4 (E.D. 
Pa. Feb. 3, 2012); 21 C.F.R. §	1240.61(a) (2018); Sean O’Conner & Erika Lietzan, The 
Surprising Reach of FDA Regulation of Cannabis, Even After Descheduling, 68 AM. U. L. 
REV. 823, 908–09 (2019) (discussing the FDA’s position on raw milk and cannabis 
products’ connection with interstate commerce); Food Safety and Raw Milk, FDA (Nov. 1, 
2011), https://web.archive.org/web/20120103191250/www.fda.gov/Food/FoodSafety/Product-
SpecificInformation/MilkSafety/ucm277854.htm [https://perma.cc/NVM5-38WJ].  
 169. See Patti Zettler, Decoding FDA’s Statement on DIY Gene Therapies, OBJECTIVE 
INTENT BLOG (Dec. 11, 2017), https://objectiveintent.blog/2017/12/11/decoding-fdas-
statement-on-diy-gene-therapies/ [https://perma.cc/KGP7-E7HL]. 
 170. 21 U.S.C. §	331 (2012). The main exception is that the FDCA prohibits actions 
that misbrand or adulterate drugs (or other articles) “while held for sale after shipment in 
interstate commerce.” Id. §	331(k). This provision allows the FDA to reach intrastate 
distribution of products that have a connection to interstate commerce earlier in the 
supply chain, such as the distribution of fentanyl to individuals in the same state that the 
drug was manufactured in, when the ingredients to make the fentanyl crossed state lines. 
See, e.g., Baker v. United States, 932 F.2d 813, 816 (9th Cir. 1991) (“We hold that wholly 
intrastate manufactures and sales of drugs are covered by 21 U.S.C. §	331(k) as long as an 
ingredient used in the final product travelled in interstate commerce.”). Courts have 
concluded that a sale has occurred under the meaning of this provision of the FDCA in a 
broad range of settings, even if the recipient does not directly pay the distributor. See, e.g., 
United States v. Kaplan, 836 F.3d 1199, 1208 (9th Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 1392 
(2017); United States v. Evers, 643 F.2d 1043, 1049 (5th Cir. 1981); United States v. Rhody 
Dairy, L.L.C., 812 F. Supp. 2d 1239, 1244 (W.D. Wash. 2011). The major limitation on this 
broad interpretation is that, in United States v. Geborde, 278 F.3d 926 (9th Cir. 2002), the 
Ninth Circuit found that a man who made a recreational drug (GHB) that he then gave to 
“several” friends for free at a house party was engaged in “wholly non-commercial” 
distribution that did not involve a product being held for sale under the meaning of the 
FDCA. Id. at 927. Where biohackers distribute DIY CRISPR products without charging 
money, that conduct may be neither as noncommercial as distributing homemade drugs to 
a small group of friends in a residential setting nor as commercial as a physician treating 
patients. In other words, it is not clear that giving away DIY CRISPR materials for free 
will be sufficient to escape FDA jurisdiction—absent a court concluding that such 
distribution is wholly noncommercial, analogous to the circumstances in Geborde. 
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fact that the Agency can potentially reach materials and kits that are 
not expressly described as for human or nonhuman animal use and 
that are freely distributed are particularly salient takeaways for DIY 
communities. The FDA also could—and likely would—determine 
that CRISPR products within its jurisdiction can be used only with a 
prescription from a licensed health care provider and cannot be sold 
directly to consumers for their own use.171 
At the same time, the FDA likely cannot reach DIY CRISPR 
activities when users make and self-administer interventions 
themselves, without having purchased products for which there is 
evidence that the products were intended for human (or nonhuman 
animal) use. The FDA also cannot regulate instructions for self-
administering interventions that are not tied to a product or provided 
on behalf of a manufacturer, seller, or distributor of DIY CRISPR 
products. Although the FDA regulates the advertising and promotion 
of prescription drugs, including prescription biological drug products, 
the Agency’s authority reaches only those statements made by or on 
behalf of product manufacturers, sellers, and distributors.172 Together, 
these exceptions describe narrow but clear gaps in the FDA’s 
oversight of the safety and effectiveness of human applications of 
DIY CRISPR. 
Moreover, even for those products within the FDA’s jurisdiction, 
it is not clear how extensively the Agency will enforce its 
requirements. The FDA generally has discretion to decide whether to 
enforce its requirements for any particular product or category of 
product,173 and despite the FDA’s November 2017 statement about 
the dangers of DIY genetic engineering, it has not yet publicly 
initiated significant enforcement activities in this space. This lack of 
enforcement may reflect, among other things, that the Agency does 
not consider DIY gene editing to be a public health priority. It is also 
possible that the Agency has concerns about its ability to demonstrate 
that DIY CRISPR products are biological drugs (for example, in the 
absence of express claims that the products address disease or affect 
the structure or function of the body). In sum, the FDA’s authority 
likely could intersect with many—although certainly not all—DIY 
 
 171. 21 U.S.C. §	353(b) (2012). 
 172. Cf. 21 C.F.R. §	201.128 (2018). 
 173. See, e.g., Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 837–38 (1985); Nathan Cortez, 
Regulating Disruptive Innovation, 29 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 175, 221 (2014); Lars Noah, 
The Little Agency That Could (Act with Indifference to Constitutional and Statutory 
Strictures), 93 CORNELL L. REV. 901, 902 (2008); Jordan Paradise, Regulatory Silence at 
the FDA, 102 MINN. L. REV. 2383, 2388 (2018). 
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CRISPR activities, but it remains to be seen whether the FDA will 
enforce its authority in this space. 
2.  NIH, State, and Local Research Requirements 
While countries like Germany prohibit gene editing (including 
the use of DIY CRISPR kits) outside of licensed facilities,174 there are 
no federal laws in the United States that limit gene editing to 
approved individuals or settings. However, since 1976, the NIH has 
regulated the conduct of research involving recombinant or synthetic 
nucleic acid molecules that is funded by the NIH or is conducted at or 
sponsored by institutions that receive NIH funds for research 
involving such molecules.175 Those rules, which are set forth in the 
NIH Guidelines for Research Involving Recombinant or Synthetic 
Nucleic Acid Molecules (“NIH Guidelines”), require approval of 
nonexempt research by an Institutional Biosafety Committee (“IBC”) 
(or at least notification to the IBC), and sometimes also approval by 
the NIH Director, NIH Office of Science Policy, or an Institutional 
Review Board (“IRB”), possibly with input from the Recombinant 
DNA Advisory Committee (“RAC”).176 The NIH Guidelines also 
require researchers to adhere to biosafety containment procedures 
 
 174. See, e.g., Gesetz zur Regelung der Gentechnik [Gentechnikgesetz – GenTG] [Act 
on the Regulation of Genetic Engineering], Dec. 16, 1993, §	8(1) (Ger.) (prohibiting 
“genetic engineering operations” except in authorized facilities); see also Bundesamt für 
Verbraucherschutz und Lebensmittelsicherheit, Genetic Engineering with Biology Kits: 
Simple but Possibly Punishable, BVL.BUND.DE (Jan. 25, 2017), https://www.bvl.bund.de/
DE/06_Gentechnik/04_Fachmeldungen/2017/2017_01_25_DIY-Kits.html [https://perma.cc/
WWS4-64L4]. Although these regulations may make it impossible for German biohackers to 
conduct gene editing in private settings, they can do so in authorized community 
laboratories. See Kristen V. Brown, Germany is Threatening Biohackers with Prison, 
GIZMODO (Feb. 9, 2017, 8:46 AM), https://gizmodo.com/germany-is-threatening-
biohackers-with-prison-1792143993 [https://perma.cc/2A4D-RMT5]. 
 175. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., NIH GUIDELINES FOR RESEARCH 
INVOLVING RECOMBINANT OR SYNTHETIC NUCLEIC ACID MOLECULES 9–10 (2016) 
[hereinafter NIH GUIDELINES]. It is the responsibility of institutions covered by the NIH 
Guidelines and those associated with them to adhere to the general intent and specific 
requirements of the NIH Guidelines. Id. at 24. 
 176. See id. at 15–23. The RAC is the public advisory committee that advises the U.S. 
Department of Health and Human Services (“HHS”) Secretary, HHS Assistant Secretary 
for Health, and NIH Director on recombinant and synthetic nucleic acid molecule 
research. Id. at 11. A proposal to eliminate RAC review of human gene transfer research 
was recently published in the Federal Register. See generally National Institutes of Health 
(NIH) Office of Science Policy (OSP) Recombinant or Synthetic Nucleic Acid Research: 
Proposed Changes to the NIH Guidelines for Research Involving Recombinant or 
Synthetic Nucleic Acid Molecules (NIH Guidelines), 83 Fed. Reg. 41,082 (Aug. 17, 2018). 
For a discussion of the evolution of RAC responsibilities, see Francis S. Collins & Scott 
Gotlieb, The Next Phase of Human Gene-Therapy Oversight, 379 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1393, 
1395 (2018). 
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that depend on the risks presented by the biological agents involved 
in specific studies.177 Risk is determined based on an assessment of 
each agent’s ability to cause disease in humans, the available 
treatments for such disease, and how the agent will be manipulated.178 
Because the vast majority of DIY biologists appear to be self-
funded and do not conduct work in NIH-funded institutions, the NIH 
Guidelines do not apply to them.179 This means that DIY biologists 
are not obligated to set and adhere to containment conditions for, or 
to obtain external approval of, their CRISPR activities in accordance 
with the NIH Guidelines. The exception is if those activities take 
place in a state or local jurisdiction that has elected to enforce the 
NIH Guidelines. New York State and the City of Cambridge, 
Massachusetts, for example, prohibit certain activities involving 
recombinant DNA without a state or local permit, where approval is 
conditioned on compliance with the NIH Guidelines.180 
Also unlike other countries,181 the United States has not adopted 
a federal ban on germline editing. However, a number of legal 
provisions have the effect of severely limiting the ability of 
researchers to edit human germlines. As noted above, genetic-
engineering products subject to FDA oversight require the 
Agency’s authorization for research or distribution. Since 2016, 
however, Congress has effectively prohibited the FDA from 
approving any intervention that involves human germline 
modification or taking any action that would allow clinical trials of 
such therapies to proceed.182 Additionally, the NIH is prohibited 
 
 177. See NIH GUIDELINES, supra note 175, at 12–15. 
 178. Id. at 12. 
 179. Nevertheless, the NIH Guidelines encourage uncovered individuals and 
institutions to follow the prescribed standards and procedures and to affiliate with 
institutions that have approved IBCs. Id. at 34. 
 180. New York restricts the conduct of recombinant DNA activities to institutions 
certified by the New York State Commissioner of Health. See N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW 
§§	3220–3223 (McKinney 2018); N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 10, subpt. 61-1 
(Westlaw through 2018). To obtain certification, an institution must provide written 
assurance that it will comply with the NIH Guidelines. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 
10, §	61-1.3. Similarly, all persons and entities who wish to conduct research using 
recombinant DNA in Cambridge, Massachusetts, must first obtain a permit from the 
Cambridge Commissioner of Health and Hospitals, which requires the applicant’s written 
agreement to comply with the NIH Guidelines. CAMBRIDGE, MASS., MUNICIPAL CODE 
ch. 8.20.050 (2017). 
 181. See Melanie Senior, UK Funding Agencies Weigh in on Human Germline Editing, 
33 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 1118, 1119 (2015) (noting that at least twenty-five 
countries prohibit human germline modification). 
 182. See I. Glenn Cohen & Eli Y. Adashi, The FDA is Prohibited from Going 
Germline, 353 SCIENCE 545, 546 (2016) (describing the history and effect of the 
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from funding the creation of human embryos for research purposes 
or research in which human embryos are destroyed, discarded, or 
subjected to risk of serious injury or death.183 Finally, for 
researchers who are covered by the NIH Guidelines, the NIH will 
not entertain proposals for human germline alterations.184  
3.  Federal Clinical Laboratory Requirements 
Although federal requirements related to gene editing do not 
apply to most DIY biologists who are self-funded and do not work in 
NIH-funded institutions, other requirements might reach the settings 
in which they conduct their research. The most relevant requirements 
govern clinical laboratories. In particular, the Clinical Laboratory 
Improvement Amendments of 1988 (“CLIA”) and implementing 
regulations require certification (or waiver of certification) of all 
laboratories where human specimens are examined for the purpose of 
providing information for the diagnosis, prevention, or treatment of 
disease or the assessment of health.185 Such laboratories must satisfy 
quality control, documentation, personnel, and proficiency testing 
requirements that are intended to help ensure the accuracy, 
reliability, and timeliness of clinical test results.186 However, the 
regulations do not apply to laboratories where testing on others is 
performed if the results are not reported back to those individuals or 
their clinicians. In such circumstances, the laboratories fall under a 
research exception to CLIA.187  
Because clinical testing generally does not take place in 
community laboratories—and indeed would be prohibited by the 
 
prohibition, which was first introduced as a rider to the Consolidated Appropriations Act 
of 2016). The rider continues to be renewed, most recently in the Consolidated 
Appropriations Act, 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-141, §	734, 132 Stat. 348, 389.  
 183. Francis S. Collins, Statement on NIH Funding of Research Using Gene-Editing 
Technologies in Human Embryos, NAT’L INSTITUTES HEALTH (Apr. 28, 2015), 
https://www.nih.gov/about-nih/who-we-are/nih-director/statements/statement-nih-funding-
research-using-gene-editing-technologies-human-embryos [https://perma.cc/X4XF-ZG83] 
(referencing the Balanced Budget Downpayment Act, I, Pub. L. No. 104-99, §	128, 110 
Stat. 26, 34 (1996)). 
 184. NIH GUIDELINES, supra note 175, at 100. 
 185. 42 U.S.C. §	263a(a) (2012); 42 C.F.R. §§	493.2–.3 (2018). 
 186. 42 U.S.C. §	263a(f)(1) (2012).  
 187. See 42 C.F.R. §	493.3(b)(2) (2018); CENTERS FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID 
SERVICES, RESEARCH TESTING AND CLINICAL LABORATORY IMPROVEMENT 
AMENDMENTS OF 1988 (CLIA) REGULATIONS (2014), https://www.cms.gov/Regulations-
and-Guidance/Legislation/CLIA/Downloads/Research-Testing-and-CLIA.pdf [https://perma.cc/
AR86-EJ25] (stating that “facilities performing research testing on human specimens that 
do not report patient-specific results may qualify to be excepted from CLIA certification” 
(emphasis omitted)).  
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safety policies of many188—it is unlikely that community laboratories 
are governed by CLIA. Although it is possible that clinical testing is 
performed in some private laboratories, we are not aware of any 
instance of this. Accordingly, federal clinical laboratory regulations 
do not appear to provide effective oversight of DIY human gene-
editing activities. 
4.  Federal and State Human Research Subject Protections 
Yet clinical applications of DIY CRISPR could be subject to 
federal rules intended to protect the safety and welfare of research 
participants. For one, if a product qualifies as an FDA-regulated drug, 
its use in clinical studies must comply with FDA human research-
subject protections.189 Independent of whether FDA rules apply, 
clinical studies involving CRISPR could be subject to federal 
protections detailed in the Federal Policy for the Protection of 
Human Subjects (known as the Common Rule).190 Like FDA human 
research-subject protections, the Common Rule requires IRB 
approval of research involving human participants, which is based on 
the determination that the anticipated risks to participants are 
minimized and reasonable in relation to the anticipated benefits and 
that participants provide their informed consent to participate.191 
However, the Common Rule is limited to studies involving human 
participants or their identifiable private information or biospecimens 
that are federally funded or supported.192 We are not aware of any 
DIY CRISPR activities that satisfy these conditions and therefore are 
regulated by the Common Rule.193 
 
 188. See discussion infra Section III.B.1.b. 
 189. Protection of Human Subjects; Prisoners Used as Subjects in Research, 45 Fed. 
Reg. 36, 386, 36,390 (May 30, 1980) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 50); Protection of 
Human Subjects; Standards for Institutional Review Boards for Clinical Investigations, 46 
Fed. Reg. 8958, 8975 (Jan. 27, 1981) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 56).  
 190. Federal Policy for the Protection of Human Subjects, 82 Fed. Reg. 7149, 7150 
(Jan. 19, 2017) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 46).  
 191. 21 C.F.R. §§	50.20, .25, 56.103, .109, .111 (2018); 45 C.F.R. §§	46.109, .111, .116 
(2018). According to both rules, informed consent is legally effective when consent is 
sought in circumstances that provide the prospective subject or her representative 
sufficient opportunity to consider whether or not to participate and that minimize the 
possibility of coercion, and where information about the risks and benefits of the study 
(among other things) is provided in a language understandable to the subject or her 
representative. 21 C.F.R. §	50.20; 45 C.F.R. §	46.116(a). 
 192. 45 C.F.R. §§	46.101(a), .102(e), (l) (2018). 
 193. Some institutions interpret the Common Rule as applicable to researchers’ 
participation in their own experiments. See, e.g., Johns Hopkins Med. Office of Human 
Subjects Research, Investigators as Study Participants (Self-Experimentation), JOHNS 
HOPKINS MED. (July 2005), https://www.hopkinsmedicine.org/institutional_review_board/
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Some states, however, have adopted protections for research 
participants that do not turn on funding source and so potentially 
reach some DIY CRISPR activities.194 Among them, California, 
which is home to a number of community laboratories, has adopted 
protections for participants in “medical experiment[s],” which are 
defined to include the  
severance or penetration or damaging of tissues of a human 
subject or the use of a drug or device .	.	. in or upon a human 
subject in the practice or research of medicine in a manner not 
reasonably related to maintaining or improving the health of 
the subject or otherwise directly benefiting the subject.195 
The few published court opinions that have interpreted 
California’s human research subject protections have done so in 
contexts involving interventions having therapeutic purposes and 
found that the rules did not apply.196 It is therefore unclear when gene 
editing conducted by DIY biologists might qualify as regulated 
medical experimentation in California. Self-experimentation would 
surely not be covered by virtue of the statute’s provisions for damages 
since one cannot sue oneself.197 On the other end of the spectrum, 
DIY clinical studies conducted as “pure” research would likely be 
 
guidelines_policies/guidelines/self_experimentation.html [https://perma.cc/T8AV-U2JM]. 
However, these institutional policies and guidelines will not reach self-experimentation 
and other activities that have no connection to those institutions. 
 194. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§	24170–24179.5 (West 2006 & Supp. 
2019); MD. CODE. ANN. HEALTH–GEN. §§	13-2001 to -2004 (Westlaw through legislation 
effective Apr. 18, 2019, from the 2019 Reg. Sess.); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW §§	2440–2446 
(McKinney 2019); VA. CODE ANN. §§	32.1-162.16 to -162.20 (2015 & Supp. 2018).  
 195. §	24174(a). “Medical experiments” also include investigational uses of drugs or 
devices conducted in accordance with FDA or state regulations applicable to clinical trials. 
Id. §	24174(b). 
 196. See, e.g., Perez v. Nidek Co., 711 F.3d 1109, 1114–16 (9th Cir. 2013) (finding that 
eye surgery had a therapeutic purpose and so was not medical experimentation and 
observing that California’s human research subject protections did not apply to physicians’ 
therapeutic off-label uses of drugs or devices, which the legislature had intentionally 
excluded from the definition of medical experimentation); In re Ariz. Theranos, Inc., 
Litig., 256 F. Supp. 3d 1009, 1044–45 (D. Ariz. 2017), partial reconsideration, Nos. 2:16-cv-
2138-HRH, 2:16-cv-2373-HRH, 2:16-cv-2660-HRH, 2:16-cv-2775-HRH, 2:16-cv-3599-
HRH, 2017 WL 4337340 (D. Ariz. Sept. 29, 2017) (holding that blood testing had a 
therapeutic purpose and was not medical experimentation where the tested individual’s 
physician prescribed medication based on the results of those tests). 
 197. See §	24176 (providing for damages against any person “primarily responsible for 
the conduct of a medical experiment” and any “representative or employee of a 
pharmaceutical company, who is directly responsible for contracting with another person 
for the conduct of a medical experiment,” in violation of the regulations). 
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covered198 and individuals would be required to provide their 
informed consent to participate.199 
Maryland, on the other hand, extends the Common Rule to all 
human subjects research occurring in the state.200 In so doing, 
Maryland adopts the Common Rule’s definition of regulated 
“research” as a “systematic investigation, including research 
development, testing, and evaluation, designed to develop or 
contribute to generalizable knowledge.”201 The scope of Maryland’s 
regulations is therefore broader than California’s and likely would 
cover all DIY CRISPR human applications (although perhaps not 
self-experimentation) regardless of whether they have any 
therapeutic purpose.202 Maryland also explicitly requires both 
independent review of protocols and the informed consent of 
participants.203 However, we are not aware of any judicial opinions 
that apply Maryland’s regulations, consistent with the relatively 
slender body of precedent interpreting state human research subject 
protections. Especially because these protections are not well tested 
in traditional research scenarios, it is unclear whether they might 
provide effective oversight of DIY CRISPR. 
5.  Patent Law 
Patent law provides an interesting—but also likely ineffective—
governance mechanism for DIY CRISPR. Foundational patents have 
been obtained on CRISPR’s basic technology, and many of those 
patents already have been licensed to biotechnology and 
pharmaceutical companies.204 Meanwhile, researchers are seeking 
 
 198. See Trantafello v. Med. Ctr. of Tarzana, 227 Cal. Rptr. 84, 87 n.2 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1986) (describing California’s protections as limited to “experiments on human subjects in 
the course of pure research”). 
 199. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§	24172–24173, 24175 (West 2006).  
 200. MD. CODE. ANN. HEALTH–GEN. §	13-2002 (Westlaw through legislation effective 
Apr. 18, 2019, from the 2019 Reg. Sess.). 
 201. Id. §	13-2001(e) (adopting the definition of “research” from 45 C.F.R. §	46.102(l) 
(2018)). 
 202. The regulations are enforced by Maryland’s Office of Attorney General, id. §	13-
2004, and it is unclear whether the office would both interpret the regulations to cover 
self-experimentation and apply them to enjoin these activities. 
 203. Id. §	13-2002 (requiring that all human subjects research comply with the 
Common Rule). 
 204. See Jorge L. Contreras & Jacob S. Sherkow, CRISPR, Surrogate Licensing, and 
Scientific Discovery, 355 SCIENCE 698, 698 (2017). The owner of the foundational patent 
on CRISPR in eukaryotic cells has been the subject of a protracted legal battle, which was 
recently settled in favor of the Broad Institute. See generally Regents of the Univ. of Cal. 
v. Broad Inst., 903 F.3d 1286 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (holding that there was no interference-in-
fact); Heidi Ledford, Pivotal CRISPR Patent Battle Won by Broad Institute, NATURE 
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patent protection for numerous, narrower CRISPR components and 
applications.205 From 2000 to 2015, patent applications were filed 
around the world on over 600 CRISPR discoveries, with the majority 
filed in the United States.206 
The owner of an issued patent has a legal right to stop others 
from making, using, selling, or offering to sell the patented discovery 
for twenty years from the application date.207 Those who conduct any 
of these activities without the patent owner’s permission are liable for 
direct patent infringement, which is a strict liability offense.208 This 
means that one’s knowledge (or lack of knowledge) of the patent is 
generally irrelevant; an individual can be liable for infringing a patent 
about which she is completely ignorant.209 One’s reasons for infringing 
a patent, even if innocent and noncommercial, also are generally 
irrelevant.210 
Applying these rules to the large and still expanding CRISPR 
patent landscape, many individuals using CRISPR in DIY settings 
may be infringing one or more CRISPR patents.211 If sued for 
infringement, however, they may be able to rely on an experimental 
 
(Sept. 10, 2018), https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-018-06656-y [https://perma.cc/
46GJ-TBCW] (discussing the outcome of the litigation). 
 205. See Knut J. Egelie et al., The Emerging Patent Landscape of CRISPR–Cas Gene 
Editing Technology, 34 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 1025, 1028–29 (2016). 
 206. See id. at 1027–29. 
 207. See 35 U.S.C. §	154 (2012 & 2017 Supp.) (defining patent term); id. §	271 (2012) 
(defining patent infringement). 
 208. Jurgens v. CBK, Ltd., 80 F.3d 1566, 1570 n.2 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (explaining that a 
court must award damages for direct patent infringement “regardless of the intent, 
culpability or motivation of the infringer”); Robert P. Merges, A Few Kind Words for 
Absolute Infringement Liability in Patent Law, 31 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1, 3 (2016) (“Put 
simply, patent infringement is an absolute liability regime.”). 
 209. Tun-Jen Chiang, The Reciprocity of Search, 66 VAND. L. REV. 1, 10 (2013) (noting 
that “anyone who makes, uses, or sells something that is covered by a patent will infringe, 
even if he is unaware of the patent”).  
 210. There are exceptions to this rule for medical practitioners whose infringing 
activities constitute medical activities, 35 U.S.C. §	287(c) (2012); individuals whose 
infringing activities are for the purpose of obtaining regulatory approval of drugs or 
medical devices, id. §	271(e)(1); and individuals whose infringing activities are for the 
purpose of amusement or curiosity, infra text accompanying notes 212–214. In addition, 
liability for indirect patent infringement “requires the patentee to establish that the 
accused infringer acted with some measure of intentionality or scienter.” Merges, supra 
note 208, at 3 n.1.  
 211. However, they would not infringe patents on CRISPR materials obtained from 
providers like Addgene that distribute exclusively pursuant to Material Transfer 
Agreements. Information for Tech Transfer Offices (TTOs), ADDGENE, 
https://www.addgene.org/techtransfer/tto/#request-process [https://perma.cc/LW6Q-9M6E]; 
see also Jacob S. Sherkow, Patent Protection for Microbial Technologies, 364 FEMS 
MICROBIOLOGY LETTERS, Sept. 25, 2017, at 1, 2. 
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use defense, which is an exception to the rule of strict liability. That 
defense excuses patent infringement where the purpose is “for 
amusement, to satisfy idle curiosity, or for strictly philosophical 
inquiry.”212 Although the defense has been characterized as narrow213 
and inapplicable where the alleged infringement “is in any way 
commercial in nature,”214 many DIY biology activities might qualify. 
But it is unlikely that citizen bioscientists will ever need to 
invoke this defense given the strong tradition in the life sciences of 
not enforcing patents against those conducting noncommercial 
research. For example, the Broad Institute, which is an assignee of 
several foundational CRISPR patents, has publicly committed to 
making its patents and other intellectual property freely available for 
noncommercial uses.215 That patent litigation is expensive and 
patentees may be unlikely to recover significant damages from citizen 
bioscientists are additional reasons why patent law may not be a 
reliable constraint on DIY CRISPR.216 Because entrepreneurs are a 
growing constituency of community laboratories, however, it will be 
interesting to follow whether any companies that incubate in these 
spaces are sued for patent infringement. 
6.  Tort Law 
Finally, state tort law indirectly governs DIY CRISPR by 
providing a mechanism for DIY biologists harmed during these 
activities to recover damages from those who might be responsible. 
For example, persons injured in the course of using DIY CRISPR 
materials and kits expressly described as intended for educational or 
basic discovery purposes could bring tort claims against the 
manufacturers or distributors of the products, notwithstanding a lack 
 
 212. Embrex, Inc. v. Serv. Eng’g Corp., 216 F.3d 1343, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (quoting 
Roche Prods., Inc. v. Bolar Pharm. Co., 733 F.2d 858, 863 (Fed. Cir. 1984)). 
 213. Madey v. Duke Univ., 307 F.3d 1351, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2002); see also Katherine J. 
Strandburg, What Does the Public Get? Experimental Use and the Patent Bargain, 2004 
WIS. L. REV. 81, 87 (observing that “the experimental-use exemption has been reduced to 
a mere de minimis exception”). 
 214. Madey, 307 F.3d at 1362. 
 215. See Principles for Disseminating Scientific Innovations, BROAD INST., 
https://www.broadinstitute.org/principles-disseminating-scientific-innovations [https://perma.cc/
W3Y6-J4AX]; Issi Rozen, Licensing of IP to Maximize Public Benefit, BROAD INST. (Dec. 
16, 2016), https://www.broadinstitute.org/node/35316 [https://perma.cc/N4LP-2SYV]. 
 216. See Telephone Interview with Josiah Zayner, Founder and CEO, The ODIN 
(Aug. 6, 2018) (on file with author) (“Here’s the thing is most people who do biohacking 
don’t have much money.”); cf. Gallegos et al., supra note 32, at 1214 (considering 
infringement of insulin patents by individuals practicing those patents at home and 
concluding that infringement actions would be exceedingly rare given, among other things, 
the high cost of such lawsuits).  
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of evidence that they intended the products to be used in humans.217 
As another example, individuals who are injured in the course of 
following instructions describing how to edit one’s genetic material 
could bring state tort claims against those who provided the 
instructions.218 
A full examination of biohackers’ potential tort liability under 
state law, including an analysis of the likely success of such claims, is 
beyond the scope of this Article. Nevertheless, it has the potential to 
be an important mechanism for encouraging safe practices in DIY 
biology and the full disclosure of risks associated with DIY CRISPR 
activities. Indeed, during interviews with biohackers, concerns that 
individuals who replicate their experiments might be injured, and 
interviewees’ potential liability in such circumstances, were frequently 
raised. These concerns also have factored into interviewees’ decisions 
regarding when and how to disclose some of their activities on social 
media sites and YouTube. 
However, like patent law, state tort law is enforced in civil 
litigation, which can be expensive. Moreover, because injured 
individuals will not be able to recover damages from those citizen 
bioscientists who lack significant financial resources, lawsuits may be 
limited as a practical matter to those involving commercial defendants 
or others with deep pockets. We are not aware of any U.S. tort cases 
alleging injuries resulting from DIY biology activities, but if such a 
case is pursued, its outcome will depend on the scope of and remedies 
provided by the governing state’s laws and, of course, on the precise 
facts giving rise to the action. 
B. Internal Oversight 
The foregoing examination of potential external oversight 
mechanisms for DIY CRISPR reveals that there are gaps both in the 
scope of regulatory authority and the extent to which regulators and 
rights holders may choose to enforce the authority that they do have. 
Over the years, citizen bioscientists have filled some of these gaps 
through mechanisms of self-regulation that address ethical and safety 
concerns. In addition, many commercial suppliers of biological 
materials have adopted practices that have the effect of restricting 
 
 217. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. §	2 (1998). 
 218. Cf. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §	302 (1965) (“A negligent act or 
omission may be one which involves an unreasonable risk of harm to another through .	.	. 
the foreseeable action of the other”); id. §	302A (“An act or an omission may be negligent 
if the actor realizes or should realize that it involves an unreasonable risk of harm to 
another through the negligent or reckless conduct of the other .	.	.	.”). 
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sales to those who are considered trustworthy. This section describes 
these and other internal oversight mechanisms for DIY CRISPR. 
1.  Self-Regulation by DIY Biologists 
a. Ethics Standards and Practices 
Ethical conduct, or at least the avoidance of unethical conduct, is 
a stated priority for many DIY biologists. One of the earliest 
accomplishments of DIYbio.org was its organization of two 
congresses in 2011 that developed an ethical framework for DIY 
biology communities.219 That framework is embodied in similar (but 
distinct) codes of ethics for North America and Europe, both of 
which endorse “transparency” and “peaceful purposes,” among other 
values.220 At the local level, some community laboratories and 
individual projects also have endorsed statements with ethical 
foundations. For example, the project wiki for Real Vegan Cheese 
includes a “Statement of Ethics” that describes the project’s 
commitment to education, tinkering, and access to tools and technical 
knowledge.221 
Far trickier than agreeing on general ethical principles and 
values has been determining when and how to review the ethical 
implications of specific projects. As explained above, every study 
protocol involving human participants that is federally funded or 
supported, or that constitutes a clinical investigation under the 
purview of the FDA, must be reviewed for compliance with ethical 
standards by an IRB.222 In addition, some institutions provide 
research-ethics services that scientists can consult independent of, or 
complementary to, IRB review.223 However, federal IRB regulations 
generally do not apply to the activities of DIY biologists, and DIY 
biologists who nevertheless would like some sort of ethics guidance 
(even if they are not legally obligated to obtain it) may not have 
access to an institution-based IRB or ethics consultation service. 
 
 219. See Codes, supra note 92. 
 220. See id. 
 221. Ethical, Legal, and Social Implications, REAL VEGAN CHEESE, 
https://web.archive.org/web/20170222164858/https://wiki.realvegancheese.org/index.php/Et
hical,_Legal,_and_Social_Implications [https://perma.cc/S539-SQ6M]. In furtherance of its 
commitment to decentralized access to biotechnology, the project plans to obtain a patent 
on its discoveries and then abandon the patent to the public domain. Id. 
 222. See supra notes 189–191 and accompanying text. 
 223. See Mildred K. Cho et al., Strangers at the Benchside: Research Ethics 
Consultation, AM. J. BIOETHICS, Mar. 2008, at 4, 4. 
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As an alternative, DIY biologists might constitute (and even 
register with the federal government) their own ethics review boards 
or pay independent, for-profit boards, such as WIRB-Copernicus, to 
review their plans for ethical concerns. However, the creation of 
ethics review boards by DIY biologists does not appear to be 
common,224 and we are not aware of any instance in which a DIY 
biologist obtained an ethics opinion from an independent, for-profit 
board. This may be due to limited resources, but it also may reflect a 
libertarian spirit that is common in DIY biology. BioCurious, for 
example, informs members that it will not “exercise editorial control 
over the science done in the lab” and therefore will not make 
“judgment calls” as to whether members’ experiments are—or are 
not—ethical.225 
New models of ethics review have been proposed that may better 
align with the practice and ethos of citizen bioscience. One model 
invites “citizen ethicists” to conduct nonbinding ethical assessments 
of proposed research and post their opinions online.226 On 
DIYgenomics.org, an online platform that facilitates collaboration on 
studies that citizen bioscientists design and execute themselves, two 
citizen ethicists were identified in connection with studies, although it 
is unclear whether the citizen ethicists completed any ethical 
assessments of specific protocols.227 Additionally, at least one 
 
 224. An example of a citizen bioscience group that has constituted and registered its 
own ethics review board is Citizen Science Belleville (“CSB”). CSB’s review board has 
adopted procedures that diverge in many ways from those followed by institution-based 
IRBs. For example, CSB’s review board issues written decisions of reviews that resemble 
judicial decisions. For more information, see Citizen Science Belleville IRB Procedures, 
OPEN SCI. FRAMEWORK, https://osf.io/6hyd7/ [https://perma.cc/Q74W-RFC6]. 
 225. See BIOCURIOUS SAFETY RULES 2 (version 2.6) [hereinafter BIOCURIOUS 
SAFETY RULES], https://docs.google.com/document/d/1NrAOBsKgPDZiE1la_g6USZU-
9iuNFqFlSAEoU3lurPw/edit [https://perma.cc/P32N-F2ZP]. However, BioCurious 
requires strict compliance with its safety rules. Id. at 1 (stating that the laboratory “will not 
compromise on safety”). 
 226. See Amy Dockser Marcus, The Ethics of Experimenting on Yourself, WALL ST. J. 
(Oct. 24, 2014), https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-ethics-of-experimenting-on-yourself-
1414170041?KEYWORDS=amy+dockser+marcus [https://perma.cc/XU8U-ZWL8]; see 
also Effy Vayena & John Tasioulas, The Ethics of Participant-Led Biomedical Research, 31 
NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 786, 787 (2013) (discussing the potential for crowdsourced 
ethics review). 
 227. However, they did post answers to two questions regarding the handling of study 
risks. See DIYgenomics Citizen Ethicist Review, DIYGENOMICS, 
http://diygenomics.pbworks.com/w/page/53826289/Ethical_Review [https://perma.cc/6U57-
YZX6]; see also Welcome to DIYgenomics!, DIYGENOMICS, 
http://diygenomics.pbworks.com/w/page/23041784/Welcome%20to%20DIYgenomics%21 
[https://perma.cc/GE5W-DHQ5] (discussion under “DIYgenomics citizen science ethics 
and standards”). 
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biohacker informed us that he has cobbled together an informal 
“ethics board” of trusted individuals whom he consults on an as-
needed basis.228 Meanwhile, some support the development of ethics 
toolkits and guidance for DIY communities.229 
b. Safety Standards and Practices 
Although DIY biologists have not reached a consensus regarding 
management of ethical issues, there is broad agreement that safety 
issues should be managed by reference to a guidance document 
developed by the NIH and the Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention (“CDC”). Considered the cornerstone of biosafety 
practices in the United States, Biosafety in Microbiological and 
Biomedical Laboratories (“BMBL”) describes recommended 
microbiological practices, safety equipment, and facility safeguards 
that correspond to four levels of containment known as biosafety 
levels (“BSLs”).230 BSL 1 describes a basic level of protection and is 
appropriate for handling biological agents “not known to consistently 
cause disease in immunocompetent healthy adults.”231 Individuals 
working in BSL 1 laboratories are advised to use personal protective 
equipment when appropriate and have access to a sink, but research 
may be conducted at open benches.232 The BSL 2 designation is 
appropriate for handling moderate-risk agents that cause human 
disease of varying severity by ingestion or skin or mucous membrane 
exposure.233 It is recommended that BSL 2 laboratories follow 
additional precautions, such as routine decontamination of equipment 
and use of physical containment devices.234 BSL 3 and 4 laboratories 
 
 228. Telephone Interview with Sebastian Cocioba, Founder and CEO, N.Y. Botanics 
(Sept. 7, 2018) (on file with author). 
 229. See TODD KUIKEN, ELEONORE PAUWELS & SARAH W. DENTON, WOODROW 
WILSON CTR., THE RISE OF THE NEW BIO-CITIZEN: ETHICS, LEGITIMACY, AND 
RESPONSIBLE GOVERNANCE IN CITIZEN-DRIVEN BIOMEDICAL RESEARCH AND 
INNOVATION 7–9 (2018), https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/7.3.18_
chi_workshop-report__1.pdf [https://perma.cc/K57X-UKXG] (describing consensus 
among workshop participants that ethical considerations must be included in toolkits to 
assist “biocitizens” who initiate or conduct health research). 
 230. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., PUB. NO. 21-1112, BIOSAFETY IN 
MICROBIOLOGICAL AND BIOMEDICAL LABORATORIES, at iii, 4, 30–59 (Deborah E. 
Wilson & L. Casey Chosewood eds., 5th ed. 2009) [hereinafter BMBL]. The BMBL was 
first published in 1984 and last revised in 2009. Id. at iii. 
 231. Id. at 4, 30. 
 232. Id. at 30–33. 
 233. Id. at 4, 33. 
 234. Id. at 33–38. In addition, the BMBL states that individuals working in BSL 2 
laboratories should be supervised by scientists “competent in handling infectious agents 
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handle the most dangerous materials and therefore are advised to 
follow the most stringent containment procedures.235 
Compliance with the BMBL is generally voluntary.236 However, 
it is broadly respected across laboratory settings. Community 
laboratories in particular usually adhere to BMBL standards, with 
most designating themselves as BSL 1, although at least one 
community laboratory appears to maintain space designated as BSL 
2.237 Interviewees who operate home laboratories also informed us 
that they are aware of and make an effort to comply with BMBL 
standards.238 
The containment practices of community laboratories are often 
set forth in safety policies, some of which explicitly reference BSL 
levels.239 These policies describe requirements related to protective 
wear and procedures for handling, transporting, and disposing of 
materials. They also detail limits, and in some cases outright 
prohibitions, on certain activities. For example, at BioCurious, work 
with human samples is generally not allowed except that members 
may analyze buccal and saliva samples under certain conditions.240 
BioCurious also allows genetic manipulation and recombination, 
although members may not deliberately work to create organisms 
 
and associated procedures,” id. at 33, whereas supervision in BSL 1 laboratories may be 
conducted by scientists trained generally in microbiology or a related science, id. at 30. 
 235. Id. at 38–58. For BSL 4 laboratories, these materials include exotic agents that 
pose a high individual risk of life-threatening disease for which no treatment is available. 
Id. at 45. 
 236. See id. at iii (emphasizing the BMBL’s status as an “advisory document 
recommending best practices” rather than a regulatory document); see also Rebecca 
Emerson, Comment, Biosafety Regulations: Who’s Watching the Lab? Safety in High Risk 
Infectious Disease Research, 25 TEMP. J. SCI. TECH. & ENVTL. L. 213, 218 n.44 (2006). 
However, compliance with or consideration of the BMBL might be required in certain 
circumstances. See BMBL, supra note 230, at iii. For example, it is required of federal 
grant recipients. See FRANK GOTTRON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R45491, SCIENCE AND 
TECHNOLOGY ISSUES IN THE 116TH CONGRESS 32 (2019). 
 237. See About Us, COUNTER CULTURE LABS, https://www.counterculturelabs.org/
info--history.html [https://perma.cc/T2EB-JBUV] (identifying BSL 1 and 2 areas on site 
map). 
 238. See, e.g., Telephone Interview with Sebastian Cocioba, supra note 228 (stating 
that, in his home laboratory, he “stick[s] to materials and organisms that are within 
biosafety level 1 confines”). But see Yin, supra note 20 (reporting criticism of Dr. Zayner’s 
laboratory practices as noncompliant with “basic biosafety protocols”). 
 239. See, e.g., BALT. UNDER GROUND SCI. SPACE, BUGSS SAFETY MANUAL (version 
1.1, July 2012) [hereinafter BUGSS SAFETY MANUAL], http://www.smilesaidtheriver.com/
bugsswordpress2/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/bugss_safety_manual_v_1.1.pdf [https://perma.cc/
5AFY-48NF]. 
 240. See BIOCURIOUS SAFETY RULES, supra note 225, at 8. 
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that would be pathogenic to humans.241 The safety manual adopted by 
BUGSS includes similar restrictions.242 
In addition to adopting safety policies and designating 
individuals responsible for compliance, some community laboratories 
require that members’ projects pass a safety review before they are 
allowed to begin. The directors of Genspace, for example, conduct 
mandatory safety reviews of proposed projects, sometimes in 
consultation with the laboratory’s safety advisory committee.243 
HiveBio, a Seattle community laboratory, similarly mandates 
unanimous approval of new projects by a safety review board.244 
While a grant-funded effort is currently underway to improve 
and standardize safety policies and practices across DIY communal 
settings,245 the effectiveness of these policies and practices depends, at 
least in part, on their enforcement. It is not uncommon for 
community laboratories to require members to demonstrate their 
safety knowledge by passing a test or completing a class.246 In at least 
one case, a prospective member who failed the required safety test 
multiple times was reported to other community laboratories as a 
safety risk.247 In addition, designated safety officers generally monitor 
compliance with laboratory policies and may even be required to be 
on site during hours of operation.248 The design of community 
laboratories as open—and usually small—spaces also facilitates peer 
 
 241. Id. 
 242. BUGSS SAFETY MANUAL, supra note 239. 
 243. These procedures are described in GRUSHKIN ET AL., supra note 81, at 19. 
 244. About, HIVEBIO, http://www.hivebio.org/about/ [https://perma.cc/8NEN-ELKB]. 
Approval of new projects also requires documented review of lab safety protocol. Id. 
 245. Led by the former executive director of Genspace and a scholar at North Carolina 
State University, this work, which is funded by a $700,000 grant from the Open 
Philanthropy Project, comprises identifying existing safety practices at community 
laboratories and establishing early career biosafety officers at select community 
laboratories for the purpose of nurturing biosafety specialization in those settings. See 
Patti Mulligan, Upgrading Biosafety and Biosecurity: Open Philanthropy Awards $700K 
for DIYbio, N.C. ST. U. (Sept. 22, 2017), https://research.ncsu.edu/ges/2017/09/upgrading-
biosafety-biosecurity-at-diybio-labs/ [https://perma.cc/ENP3-S28H]. 
 246. See, e.g., BUGSS MEMBERSHIP APPLICATION, supra note 131, at 2 (requiring that 
members who want to work independently in the laboratory first complete a biosafety 
course); What Happens After Joining?, BIOCURIOUS, https://biocuriosity.wordpress.com/
join/what-happens-after-joining/ [https://perma.cc/6KAW-2JUD] (requiring that new 
members achieve a 100 percent on a safety quiz before being allowed to work in the 
laboratory). 
 247. See CTR. FOR GLOB. SEC. RESEARCH, supra note 112, at 7. 
 248. See, e.g., About, supra note 244. 
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support and monitoring.249 Finally, many community laboratories 
require their members to sign agreements or contracts that describe 
member responsibilities and penalties for engaging in prohibited 
activities. For example, the BUGSS membership agreement states 
that disregard for personal safety, reckless endangerment of others, 
and use of equipment for illegal purposes can result in restrictions on 
or even termination of one’s membership.250 Community laboratories’ 
enforcement practices have not yet been systematically described, 
although we suspect that enforcement actions are rare given that 
members self-select into communities for which safety is an explicit 
priority. 
Of course, laboratories’ safety policies and practices are not 
binding on DIY biologists who work in private settings. One does not 
need to pass a biosafety test—or even be aware of biosafety 
standards—to tinker at home. Further, for those with safety 
questions, professional advice is not readily available. Responding to 
this need, in 2013, DIYbio.org launched an online “Ask a Biosafety 
Professional” forum through which volunteer biosafety experts 
answered questions posed by citizen bioscientists, who were allowed 
to participate anonymously.251 In 2014, however, the forum was closed 
to new questions.252 
Although there do not currently appear to be any other 
structured mechanisms for DIY biologists working in private settings 
to obtain professional safety advice, they frequently discuss safety 
issues in discussion groups dedicated to DIY biology, such as the 
DIYbio Google Group and Biohack.me, as well as on Facebook, 
Twitter, and other social media platforms.253 While many of these 
conversations are directed to sharing and helping, social shaming also 
 
 249. See Scheifele & Burkett, supra note 124, at 84 (noting that, “due to their limited 
space and communal nature, community labs can actually guard against clandestine 
activities and enable safety and regulatory oversight of amateur scientists”). 
 250. See BUGSS MEMBERSHIP APPLICATION, supra note 131, at 3; see also 
BioCurious Membership Agreement, BIOCURIOUS (June 7, 2017), https://docs.google.com/
document/d/e/2PACX-1vQHZZvoERCqR1HJuGTq2-xga-Pip_kl4x5kzMtx08wQAvg6tN
E8yxtYjTBTesaE3akEmh7dJJfTkKjj/pub [https://perma.cc/E4J5-VJDK] (providing that 
“[l]ying or misleading the Safety Officer is grounds for immediate membership 
termination”). 
 251. Ask a Biosafety Professional Your Question, DIYBIO, http://ask.diybio.org/ 
[https://perma.cc/X4DU-8TC2]. 
 252. See Ask a Biosafety Officer—Closed, DIYBIO, https://diybio.org/ask-biosafety-
notice/ [https://perma.cc/MNU9-5XLB]. 
 253. For example, one discussion on the DIYbio Google Group forum concerns how to 
safely dispose of old cultures. Safely Disposing of Old Cultures?, GOOGLE GROUPS (Mar. 
4–21, 2017), https://groups.google.com/forum/#!searchin/diybio/%22is$20it$20safe%22%
7Csort:date/diybio/lT9JlRSsKMQ/a-LXT0-rCQAJ [https://perma.cc/KM8F-R8EA]. 
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takes place when individuals are perceived to be engaging in unsafe 
conduct.254 This is consistent with the general observation of one 
interviewee that some biohackers “will quite happily call people out” 
if they do not respect community norms.255 
2.  Self-Regulation by Suppliers 
a. Screening Protocols and Practices 
To conduct gene editing, DIY biologists must have the necessary 
biological materials—including Cas proteins and gRNA—to execute 
their experiments. Many major commercial suppliers compete in this 
market. Except with respect to materials that qualify as regulated 
toxins or select agents,256 there are generally no legal restrictions on 
 
 254. For example, on Biohack.me, one poster warned of the dangers of attempting to 
transform one’s skin cells to bioluminesce:  
[Y]ou should probably learn a lot more biology before messing with your DNA. 
.	.	. Take it very seriously and give it the respect it deserves or run the risk of very 
seriously [messing] yourself up. People are getting all excited about gene mods and 
wanting to just jump in cause they saw others do it. IT’S NOT A GOOD IDEA 
unless you know what you’re doing.” 
 Chironex, Comment to Fluorescent & Luminescent Modification, BIOHACK.ME (Sept. 
2018), https://forum.biohack.me/index.php?p=/discussion/comment/26495#Comment_26495 
[https://perma.cc/CF3Z-NB7H]; see also Chironex, Comment to Playing with Viruses, 
supra note 139 (publishing a response to another poster’s announcement of plans to 
conduct DIY CRISPR in the near future: “If you don’t know what you’re doing, you 
shouldn’t even consider using crispr on yourself. Hell even if you do, you probably still 
shouldn’t. .	.	. Crispr is brand new tech and every week more papers come out showing we 
don’t know enough about how it works and risk of unintended mutations can be very high 
without proper thought, and even if things have been carefully considered because of the 
complexity of biology. It’s cute that you read about crispr, but evidently you haven’t taken 
a .	.	. biology class.”). 
 255. See Telephone Interview with Tristan Roberts, Researcher, Transcendence Sys. 
(Aug. 8, 2018) (on file with author) (commenting on informal penalties for failure to 
respect community norms related to attribution and ownership). 
 256. All U.S. research must comply with federal regulations that apply to the handling 
of select agents and toxins, which are substances identified by HHS or the U.S. 
Department of Agriculture (“USDA”) as having the potential to pose a severe threat to 
public health and safety or to animal or plant health or products. See 7 C.F.R. §	331.2 
(2018); 9 C.F.R. §	121.2 (2018); 42 C.F.R. §	73.2 (2018). HHS and USDA currently 
regulate over sixty select agents and toxins, including ricin and the Ebola virus, by 
restricting their possession, use, and transfer to only individuals and entities holding 
certificates of registration approved by the Federal Select Agent Program (“FSAP”). See 
Select Agents and Toxin List, FED. SELECT AGENT PROGRAM, 
https://www.selectagents.gov/selectagentsandtoxinslist.html [https://perma.cc/RL7V-SN3A] 
(identifying regulated select agents and toxins). These restrictions are detailed in 7 C.F.R. 
§	331.7 (2018), 9 C.F.R. §	121.7 (2018), and 42 C.F.R. §	73.7 (2018). We are not aware of 
any instance in which a DIY biologist attempted to register with FSAP, although such an 
97 N.C. L. REV. 1399 (2019) 
2019] DIY CRISPR 1451 
who can purchase biological materials. Yet, concerns have long been 
raised about the potential misuse of synthesized genetic material to 
design pathogens or introduce mutations that harm public health or 
the environment.257 
In recent years, policies have been developed to address these 
concerns. Specifically, in 2010, the U.S. Department of Health and 
Human Services (“HHS”) released screening guidance for double-
stranded DNA synthesis companies.258 Around the same time, 
companies representing 80% of the global commercial gene synthesis 
capacity formed the International Gene Synthesis Consortium 
(“IGSC”) and developed its own screening protocol for members.259 
The IGSC protocol, which was recently updated, describes a two-step 
process.260 First, orders of synthetic double-stranded DNA sequences 
are checked against a database of regulated pathogens.261 Second, 
buyers are screened against multiple national watch lists and checked 
for institutional affiliations.262 In some cases, buyers are also 
investigated to ensure that they are bona fide end users and may be 
required to explain their proposed experiments.263 
Importantly, neither protocol is legally binding.264 Many suppliers 
may nevertheless choose to comply with HHS or similar screening 
protocols.265 But there is scant data on the screening procedures that 
 
application would surely be denied if submitted given the stringent security and safety 
conditions that must be met for approval. 
 257. See supra note 33 and accompanying text. 
 258. See generally Screening Framework Guidance for Providers of Synthetic Double-
stranded DNA, 75 Fed. Reg. 62,820 (Oct. 13, 2010). 
 259. INT’L GENE SYNTHESIS CONSORTIUM, HARMONIZED SCREENING PROTOCOL V. 
2.0, ¶	1 (2017) [hereinafter IGSC PROTOCOL]. 
 260. Id. ¶¶	2–3. 
 261. Id. ¶	2. In 2015, it was reported that approximately 5% of orders are flagged for 
further review based on this screen. See SARAH R. CARTER & ROBERT M. FRIEDMAN, 
DNA SYNTHESIS & BIOSECURITY: LESSONS LEARNED AND OPTIONS FOR THE FUTURE 
11–12 (2015). 
 262. See IGSC PROTOCOL, supra note 259, ¶	3; CARTER & FRIEDMAN, supra note 261, 
at 10. 
 263. IGSC PROTOCOL, supra note 259, ¶¶	3.3, 3.5. Notably, if a citizen bioscientist 
informs a supplier that she plans to use the materials for self-experimentation (or on other 
humans or nonhuman animals), that might cause the material to be a biological drug 
product subject to FDA regulation. See discussion supra Section III.A.1. 
 264. Further, neither protocol applies to short, single-stranded DNA orders, which can 
be used to construct genes and gene fragments, or DNA synthesizers. CARTER & 
FRIEDMAN, supra note 261, at 19–21. 
 265. See id. at 13. 
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have been adopted by suppliers of biological materials or how closely 
they are adhering to those procedures.266 
It is also unclear what effect suppliers’ screening procedures are 
having on DIY biologists in particular. Assuming that the vast 
majority of orders placed for DIY CRISPR activities do not include 
materials listed in any pathogen database, the main hurdle that 
biohackers face is customer screening. Yet there is anecdotal 
evidence that this hurdle is not always difficult to overcome. Given 
the various CRISPR activities that are taking place in community 
laboratories,267 it does not appear that DIY biologists who work in 
these settings are having trouble obtaining materials for their 
CRISPR experiments. Meanwhile, DIY biologists who work in 
private settings have identified ways to pass customer screening. For 
example, biohacker David Ishee registered a company in his home 
state in part to satisfy suppliers that only ship to institutional 
addresses.268 Although IGSC at one point flagged Mr. Ishee, his order 
was ultimately approved after he was able to convince the screener 
that he “wasn’t a crazy person.”269 
b. Pricing Mechanisms 
Another approach to screening customers—albeit an indirect 
one—is through price. Biological materials purchased from 
commercial suppliers are expensive; they run into hundreds and even 
thousands of dollars for some protocols. Grant-funded researchers 
budget for these costs in funding applications, and commercial 
researchers can pass them on to customers. But the typical biohacker 
is self-funded and may not be able to afford materials from 
commercial suppliers.270 
To facilitate free access to materials, in late 2017, the nonprofit 
BioBricks Foundation launched the Free Genes Project, which 
coordinates the synthesis and distribution of DNA sequences to 
 
 266. See id. at 8 (observing that “details of how any one company has reviewed or will 
review any specific order remain unclear”). 
 267. See supra text accompanying notes 127–130. 
 268. Telephone Interview with David Ishee, supra note 85; see also Where Do DIY 
Biologists Get Things Like CRISPR or Genes, GOOGLE GROUPS (Oct. 2017), 
https://groups.google.com/forum/#!searchin/diybio/CRISPR%7Csort:date/diybio/lbuIYFd
UW0c/2HNq9rqDAQAJ [https://perma.cc/EB4J-6LA2] (forum discussion on obtaining 
CRISPR materials). 
 269. Telephone Interview with David Ishee, supra note 85. 
 270. Cf. Telephone Interview with Josiah Zayner, supra note 216. 
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anyone who requests them at no cost.271 Meanwhile, a number of 
biohackers are avoiding institutional suppliers altogether when 
possible and sharing materials with each other. For example, in 
September 2018, a Florida biohacker gave away approximately 
$25,000 worth of gene lines to attendees of a biohacking 
convention.272 This same individual is spearheading the development 
of a free library of biological materials.273 
IV.  FUTURE OVERSIGHT POSSIBILITIES 
Our examination of the existing regulatory framework for DIY 
CRISPR reveals that it is potentially more robust than is commonly 
believed but certain activities remain outside its reach. Yet, because 
no regulatory scheme can be perfectly effective nor completely 
comprehensive, the existence of such gaps in oversight does not 
necessarily compel the conclusion that regulatory changes are needed. 
Accordingly, this part evaluates whether existing oversight 
mechanisms, considered collectively rather than individually, succeed 
in minimizing the potential risks of DIY CRISPR without unduly 
interfering with the realization of its potential educational, expressive, 
and scientific benefits. It concludes that the current regulatory 
framework seems to be working reasonably well thus far in 
discouraging especially worrisome human applications of DIY 
CRISPR. However, we are concerned about a possible future uptick 
in risky (if not illegal) human experimentation as lay understanding of 
and proficiency with the technology increases. We therefore offer 
suggestions for shoring up the oversight readiness and capacities of 
regulatory bodies and DIY communities. 
A. Evaluating Existing Oversight Mechanisms 
Given the absence of a coordinated and comprehensive 
regulatory framework, it is perhaps remarkable that there have not 
yet been any confirmed reports of DIY CRISPR activities that raise 
ethical concerns of the magnitude of those raised by the alleged 
“CRISPR babies” announced in November 2018.274 The reported 
 
 271. The Free Genes Project, BIOBRICKS FOUND., https://biobricks.org/freegenes/ 
[https://perma.cc/S65H-M3DP]. 
 272. See Christi J. Guerrini, A Gathering of Biohackers: The Future of Science?, 
BAYLOR C. MED.: POLICYWISE (Sept. 14, 2018), https://blogs.bcm.edu/2018/09/14/a-
gathering-of-biohackers-the-future-of-science/ [https://perma.cc/7CVF-98BT]. 
 273. See Zayner, Biohack the Planet, supra note 147 (starting at 47:54, Gabriel Licina 
explains the development). 
 274. See, e.g., supra notes 27–28 and accompanying text. 
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human applications of DIY CRISPR have involved only somatic—
not germline—cells, and they seem to have been voluntarily 
undertaken.275 However, it may be that such activities are being 
conducted in secret and have not yet been disclosed. 
There also have not been any confirmed reports of physical 
injuries resulting from DIY gene-editing activities. Of course, it is 
possible that such injuries have occurred but have not yet been 
reported. Citizen bioscientists who prefer to work in secret, for 
example, may be unlikely to share this kind of news. It is also possible 
that citizen bioscientists who have been injured do not understand 
that their injuries were caused by their gene-editing activities. 
On the other hand, the absence of reported injuries may reflect 
that no injuries have occurred because gene editing outside of 
professional research settings is not a particularly dangerous activity. 
Although this is plausible with respect to basic ex vivo experiments 
involving nonpathogenic biological materials, it is less plausible with 
respect to in vivo experiments, whose potential harms include 
infection, immunological reaction, and cellular changes that range 
from mild to life threatening.276 In such cases, individuals may be 
taking appropriate precautions to avoid injury when they engage in 
DIY CRISPR. While this probably helps explain the safety record of 
community laboratories, where ex vivo experiments must comply with 
safety rules and self-experimentation is prohibited, it is less clear how 
well it explains the safety record (as far as it is known) of DIY 
CRISPR undertaken in private settings. In the end, the question is an 
empirical one that has not yet been studied. 
We suspect, however, that the absence of confirmed reports of 
human applications of DIY CRISPR raising grave ethical questions 
or resulting in known injuries is in large part a function of the current 
infrequency of these activities. Although experimentation with 
CRISPR on bacteria and yeast genomes is popular across DIY 
settings,277 there are few known instances in which individuals have 
self-experimented with CRISPR,278 and we are not aware of any 
confirmed instance in which citizen bioscientists attempted to conduct 
gene editing on others. 
The infrequency of human applications of DIY CRISPR is likely 
the result of a number of factors. For one, the FDA’s jurisdiction 
 
 275. See supra note 138 and accompanying text. 
 276. See supra text accompanying note 19. 
 277. See supra notes 98, 109, 129–130 and accompanying text. 
 278. See supra notes 138–139 and accompanying text. 
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over, and requirements for, biological drug products have almost 
certainly discouraged widespread distribution of DIY CRISPR 
materials intended for in vivo human use, as well as DIY CRISPR 
activities akin to clinical trials. General confusion about how various 
federal and state laws apply to DIY biology may also have prompted 
some to err on the side of caution and steer clear of these activities.279 
Other factors that likely have contributed to the low incidence of 
human applications of DIY CRISPR include the safety policies and 
practices of community laboratories;280 the active discouragement of 
these activities by individuals posting in online forums;281 and general 
concerns about CRISPR’s safety or the ethical implications of its 
human applications. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the 
sophisticated knowledge and skills necessary to use CRISPR in 
humans is probably out of reach of most biohackers at this time.282 
In the end, there is probably some truth to each of these 
explanations. That is, the existing regulatory framework has worked 
to discourage the kinds of DIY gene-editing activities—e.g., in vivo 
human applications—that are most likely to raise serious ethical 
concerns and result in injury. At the same time, only a small number 
of biohackers currently have the knowledge, skills, and resources to 
attempt using CRISPR in humans. These individuals might also be 
reluctant to publicly disclose their gene-editing activities or resulting 
injuries, making it difficult to assess the impact of the current 
regulatory framework on the current state of affairs. 
But as DIY biologists become more adept at using CRISPR, safe 
human applications are discovered and detailed in the literature, and 
some consensus is reached about ethical questions raised by these 
applications; thus, it is not unreasonable to expect more DIY 
biologists to attempt human gene editing. It is therefore worth 
considering ways to improve the existing oversight regime. 
B. Improving Oversight of DIY CRISPR 
At the broadest level of analysis, and especially with respect to 
self-experimentation, the current regulatory framework relies heavily 
on internal oversight. In the near term, continued reliance on self-
regulation seems appropriate. There is a long tradition of self-
regulation in science that includes the voluntary guidelines that were 
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developed in 1975 at the Asilomar Conference Center in California to 
ensure the safe conduct of research involving recombinant DNA 
technology.283 Likewise, internal oversight has long played a key role 
in the conduct of DIY biology.284 While the ability of DIY biologists 
to effectively regulate themselves has been questioned,285 self-
regulation is politically well-suited to biohacking communities given 
some members’ distrust of government and the scientific 
establishment.286 Indeed, because self-regulation is consistent with the 
emphasis that DIY communities place on autonomy and flexibility, it 
is an approach that likely has and can retain broad buy in. Moreover, 
self-regulation may be an especially appropriate oversight mechanism 
for activities like DIY gene editing involving new technologies that 
are thus far not widespread nor, importantly, widely commercialized. 
Unlike external regulatory mechanisms, which can be slow to change, 
internal oversight mechanisms can be quickly adjusted to respond to 
new issues raised by emerging technologies. Finally, the costs 
associated with external intervention do not seem justified at this time 
given the low incidence of confirmed human applications of DIY 
CRISPR. 
Still, we appreciate that internal oversight has significant 
weaknesses, including vulnerability to underenforcement or, in the 
case of ethics codes, nonenforcement. Internal oversight also can be 
inconsistent—for example, different laboratories might address 
problems in different ways—and inefficient—for example, different 
laboratories might each work to develop policies for the same issues 
independently without the opportunity to learn from each other’s 
experiences. Moreover, the effectiveness of self-regulation is likely to 
change as DIY biology communities evolve, scientific understanding 
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of gene-editing progresses, and, if hopes for DIY CRISPR are 
realized, a robust market for it develops.287 It will therefore be 
important for DIY biologists and regulatory bodies to regularly 
reevaluate whether, in light of these developments, primary reliance 
on self-regulation continues to be appropriate. 
To facilitate this effort, DIY biologists should be encouraged to 
coordinate their practices in partnership with regulatory bodies. 
Recently, the Wilson Center conducted a workshop attended by 
citizen bioscientists, academics, and regulators that established an 
agenda of legal and ethical issues associated with DIY biology.288 This 
is a good start to what we hope will be a continuing and inclusive 
effort to develop best practices in DIY biology that will inform 
governance of gene editing in particular. 
One DIY activity that requires careful consideration is self-
experimentation. The slow pace of traditional research, the 
extraordinary cost of marketed gene therapies, and the reality that, 
for many conditions, we simply do not have good therapies, may drive 
some patients to attempt DIY interventions.289 These activities are 
generally not subject to external regulatory mechanisms and are not 
always discouraged by social norms. But the absence of oversight may 
assume that individuals engaged in self-experimentation appreciate 
the potential risks of their activities, when in fact they do not. While 
we are, at this time, reluctant to endorse extending existing 
regulations to self-experimentation, we support the development of 
tools to help individuals who self-experiment make more informed—
and therefore autonomous—choices. 
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This Article also encourages different factions within citizen 
bioscience to reach across the aisle and collaborate with each other. 
During interviews, it was not uncommon to hear members of 
community laboratories dismiss some biohackers who work in private 
settings as reckless or attention-seeking. On the other hand, 
biohackers working in private settings have been known to dismiss 
community laboratories as hierarchical and elitist.290 While these 
groups can have very different reasons for engaging in DIY biology, 
we were struck during interviews by the consistency of their priorities, 
which included transparency, doing good science, and having fun. 
Although some biohackers working in private settings may have a 
higher risk tolerance than those working in community laboratories, it 
also was apparent that safety remains a concern among both groups. 
In the end, the different factions of DIY biologists likely have more in 
common with each other than they think and can help each other 
better anticipate and mitigate potential harms. Collaborations among 
various factions would also likely have the benefit of yielding 
information about the scale of and trends related to DIY human gene 
editing. 
With respect to external regulations, although other countries 
and some U.S. states and municipalities prohibit the conduct of 
certain genetic research outside of licensed facilities or by anyone 
other than licensed individuals and entities,291 this Article does not 
recommend that the U.S. federal government adopt a licensing 
program at this time. For one, there is no obvious authority to 
develop and enforce such a program. The U.S. regulatory body with 
perhaps the most relevant responsibilities is the NIH Office of 
Science Policy, which coordinates all activities related to the NIH 
Guidelines. However, that office does not have experience 
implementing a licensing program. Another possibility is the Federal 
Select Agent Program, which issues certificates to individuals and 
entities authorizing their handling of select agents and toxins, but the 
focus of that program is on biological materials, not scientific 
techniques.292 In any event, a federal licensing program seems 
unnecessary at this time given that attempts to edit human genes 
outside of traditional scientific settings seem to be rare. Moreover, as 
noted by other commentators, taking such a strong regulatory 
approach could have the effect of driving this activity into the 
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shadows where it will be even more difficult to monitor.293 For now, it 
seems more appropriate to encourage disclosure and close monitoring 
of these activities. 
Finally, the FDA—the federal regulator with potentially far-
reaching jurisdiction over activities related to DIY CRISPR—should 
proactively work to help DIY communities better understand the 
scope of its authority, its requirements, and its plans for enforcement. 
Although the FDA has already made clear that it views “any use of 
CRISPR/Cas9 gene editing in humans to be gene therapy” subject to 
the requirements for biological drug products,294 many DIY biologists 
are not well versed in the intricacies of food and drug law and do not 
have access to sophisticated legal representation. Partly for those 
reasons, there is value in the Agency engaging with individual citizen 
bioscientists. Through ongoing dialogue with DIY communities, the 
FDA can help demystify its regulations and help citizen bioscientists 
understand the ways that the Agency seeks not only to prevent harm 
but also to encourage high-value innovation.295 
The FDA should also consider issuing guidance on its views 
about which DIY CRISPR activities are within the Agency’s 
jurisdiction and, of those, for which activities the Agency intends to 
enforce relevant requirements. Consistent with the Agency’s risk-
based approach to its enforcement priorities, it should focus on those 
DIY CRISPR activities within its jurisdiction that pose significant 
risks to public health.296 For example, the FDA might clarify that 
certain DIY CRISPR kits sold for educational purposes are not 
biological drug products within the Agency’s jurisdiction. It might 
also explain that it does not intend to closely examine the free 
exchange of raw biological materials that are not pathogenic but that 
it will prioritize CRISPR products distributed for use in others. 
In sum, although there are few confirmed instances of human 
applications of DIY CRISPR, there are several things that DIY 
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biologists and regulatory bodies can do to prepare for a future in 
which that is no longer the case. These include creating opportunities 
to meaningfully engage with one another to enhance mutual 
understanding and developing best practices that have buy in from 
both groups. At the same time, regulatory bodies and DIY 
communities, working together, should regularly reevaluate the 
effectiveness of the existing regulatory framework as facts on the 
ground change. 
CONCLUSION 
Academic and policy discussions about the risks, responsibilities, 
and appropriate regulation of emerging technologies go back many 
decades297 and include the landmark contributions of David 
Collingridge, who in 1980 described a paradox associated with social 
control of technologies: “When change is easy, the need for it cannot 
be foreseen; when the need for change is apparent, change has 
become expensive, difficult, and time-consuming.”298 
This paradox describes the basic problems with regulatory 
approaches at extreme ends of the temporal possibilities. On one end 
are preemptive approaches animated by the precautionary principle, 
which advises taking measures early in the development of a 
technology to prevent future threats.299 But because the technology 
has not yet been deployed and integrated into society, those threats 
are not yet known and so it is difficult to identify oversight 
mechanisms that will effectively manage them. On the other end are 
reactionary approaches that advise waiting to learn the undesirable 
impacts of a technology before intervening.300 At this point, however, 
there may be stakeholders in the technology who strongly resist the 
imposition of limits on its use. 
To manage the current safety and ethical concerns raised by DIY 
CRISPR, this Article proposes an approach that falls somewhere in 
the temporal middle. This approach is focused on encouraging the 
disclosure of information to better understand how CRISPR is, and 
soon might be, used in DIY settings, as well as promoting robust 
communication and collaboration among various citizen bioscience 
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factions and regulatory bodies to build their capacities to identify, 
prevent, and mitigate harms. Importantly, these recommendations 
assume that it will not be too late to implement new mechanisms to 
address the most serious harms should the need for doing so arise. 
The recommendations also reflect the hope that those new 
mechanisms, once implemented, will be more effective than they 
otherwise would have been because they were developed with robust 
input from the regulated communities. 
Critically, that development process will require confronting 
difficult questions regarding what constitutes scientific expertise and 
who is entitled to participate in scientific knowledge production. The 
answers not only have the potential to disrupt established scientific 
practices, institutions, and norms, but, for some biohackers, they also 
implicate fundamental individual freedoms. As explained by one 
interviewee: “[I]f [regulators] tell me I need to get a permit, I will 
happily get a permit. If they tell me I can’t do it at home, I’ll try to 
figure that out. But if they tell me I need a PhD, I will riot in the 
streets.”301 In the end, decisions regarding the regulation of DIY 
CRISPR will need to resolve not only safety, effectiveness, and 
ethical issues related to specific applications but also issues of 
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